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~I'his thesis examines the i;n.plications that the 
Nixon .. shocks" may have on JapEill' s foreign policy. 
The data used consisted of books, articles, periodicals. 
goVeTILment publications and newspapers. Examined were 
such important factors as: tt.e attitudes of the political 
parties in Japan on foreign policy questions, the rapid 
rise of the Japanese economy and the iElplications this 
has had on Japan's relations with other countries, and 
the question of Japan's possible remilitarization, 
buth in conventional ond nuclear terms. In addition, 
Japan's relations with the other three Great Powers 
in Asia, (China, the Soviet Union and the United States), 
are also studied. From about 1945 until the close of 
the 1960's, Japan's foreign policy had been based on 
a close relationship with the United States. From 
about the end of 1970 to tl'J.e end of 1971, Jap~n was 
stung by a series of "shocks" in t11e Course of Ai'nerican 
foreign policy. These included tile sudden and last 
minute announcemen"t of Nixon's visit to qhina, severe 
economic measures. the imposition of' textile quotas, 
and the failure of Japan's co-sponsoring of the United 
Nations motion allowin.~; Taiwan to keep its membership. 
The period' of 1969 to 1972 is critical to the 
future alignment of Ja~an's foreign policy. One con­
clusion from this re-ali~noent is that it is now clear 
that Japan will no longsr serve as the American junior 
partner in Asia. Japan now shows a new independent 
attitude in its relations with other countries, quite 
apart from American desire. Also in 1972 following 
the Nixon "shocks," both China and the Soviet Union 
competed against t:'le other to draw Japan aVlay from its 
American alliance. It is the shift in Japan's foreign 
policy that this thesis is concerned with. 
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The years 1968 and 1969 saw the first important 
signs of what was soon to become a significant shift in 
American global foreign policy. Stemming from the un­
popularity of American policy in Vietnam, the effects 
of this shift, as enumerated in the so-called Nixon 
doctrine of 1969, were to be most dramatically felt in 
Asia. The concentration of this paper will deal with 
the reaction that has come from Japan: the country which 
President Nixon has repeatedly called "America's most 
important ally in Asia. il 
The central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia 
is that: 
The United States will participate in the 
defense and development of its allies and 
friends, but that America cannot -- and 
will not -- conceive all the plans, design 
all the programs, execute all the decisions 
and undertake all the defense of the free 
nations in the-w0rld. We will help where 
it makes a real difference and is consid­
ered in our interest. l 
The American goals in Asia are fcr~a community of free 
lRichard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 
1970's, A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the 
Congress," on February 18, 1970. The Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. LXII, no. l60~March 9, 1970), 
p. 276. 
2 
nations able to go their own way and seek their own 
destiny with whatever cooperation we can provide -- a 
community of independent Asian countries developing 
through mutual cooperation."1%' I~~~'ritics of the 
Nixon doctrine would contend that as the United states 
reduced its commitments in Asia, a somewhat proportional 
reduction in its security would follow. 
It is a basic assumption of this paper that as 
the United States moved to reduce its political, mili­
tary and economic power in Asia, it concurrently would 
take two other actions designed to accompany and supple­
ment that move. First, the United States would parti­
cipatein a general "detente" in Asia (and elsewhere in 
the world), tending to reduce the "need" of American 
power. Second, _,the United States would begin to maneu­
ver Japan into a position of assuming greater political 
I 
and military responsibility in Asia's future. 
In contrast to the above, President Nixon on 
February 9, 1972, detailed for the United States 
congress{P exactly what he expected (or hoped) the Nixon 
211A Statement by the President at Bangkok, 
Thailand, on July 28, 1969," ibid., p. 293. 
3Richard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 
1970's, The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to 
t.he Congress," on February 9, 1972, The Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, no. 1707 (M.arch 3, 1972), 
pp. 313-418. 
3 
doctrine would mean for Japan and the other countries 
of Asia. In his first poi.nt Nixcn claimed that, as a 
result of his meeting with Japan's Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sate at San Clemente i~ January of 1972, 
Japanese-American relations were strengthened. In 
reality, however, American-Japanese relations following 
San Clemente were not strengthened. Rather, the meet­
ing by the two heads of state produced little more than 
only a partial impediment to the continued worsening 
and weakening of the ties between the two Pacific 
powers. 
A second point made by Nixon in his message to 
Congress was that the United States would regard a 
larger Japanese role in the economic and po1~tica1 af­
fairs of Asia~ot as a substitute for or interference 
with our role, but as natural, necessary and p~oper."4 
This statement also fails to be consistent with Asian 
realities. What in fact the United States was attempt­
ing to accomplish in Asia was to push Japan into assum­
ing greater political and military responsibilities. 
In addition, it seems questionable to assume that the 
UniteQ States would be content with, or would find 
"natural, necessary and proper," Japan's continued 
42£. cit., p. 317. 
4 
economic expansion in Asia, (or in the world). Through­
out the Nixon administratio~ {1969 to mid-1972}, the 
official emphasis was on the attempt to stabilize the 
Japanese economic penetration of, and competition in, 
~erican markets. It was during this period that the 
~ cries of American businessmen could be heard, 
~lamor~nq for government protection for their respec­
tive goods. In short, any increase in Japan's Asian 
political influence came largely at the expense of the 
United States. 
Given the definite limitations of American power, 
Nixon's strategy became an attempt to allow for, and 
even to push, Japan along a more independent route. 
Japan was believed to be the best alternative to the 
American decline {of both ability and ambition} in 
Asia. Second, if Japan assumed part of the financial 
defense burden of nfree n Asia, not only \'lould American 
military expenses decline, but so in part would Japan's 
competitive economic resources. Since Japan had pre­
viously pressed the advantage of penetrating American 
markets, why should the U.s. continue footing the 
defense bills? 
One must also question the third point made by 
President Nixon in his message to Congress. Therein 
Nixon stated that the recent American initiative aimed 
5 
at the People's Republic of China~ was' Lconsistent with 
the continuity of the clos~ U~S.-Japanese relation­
ship.~ In fact, however, the President knew well in 
advance that any such American-Chinese-~rapprochement 
(, ' 
could be achieved only with the ~ost partially being 
borne in the goodwill of American-Japanese relations. 
Part of this payment would come "naturally" as a result 
of the shift in the Asian balance in power. This was 
largely because any decrease in American-Chinese ani­
mosity would somewhat proportionally reduce the very 
basis of needs in the U.S.-Japanese treaty system. The 
U.S.-China .xapproch'ement~, in this sense, sign~led an end 
to the American Cold War policy of attempting to con­
tain China on all fronts. Indeed, many Japanese would 
fear that, following the Nixon visit to Peking, they had 
been left in the Cold War lurch with a government too 
tired and too inflexible to meet the challenges of a 
suddenly cold and distant world. 
This lIunnaturalli shock as an element in the U.S.­
China rapprochement, came with the "methods" used in the 
initiative. Having informed "America's most important 
SIn reference to the term "China," it will be 
meant mainland China (the People's Republic of China). 
Any reference to "Nationalist China" will be so 
specified or referred to as Taiwan. 
6Ibid• 
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ally in Asia" only minutes beforehand, Nixon made 
Japan's Prime Minister Sato appear a fool in the eyes 
of the Japanese people and the people of the world. By 
abandoning the policy that the United States and Japan 
~ 
had shared for over a quarter of a century without 
having either consulted or even informed its Asian ally 
beforehand, the United States left the government of 
Japan holding the Cold War bag. 
A fourth point stressed by President Nixon in his 
message to Congress found him on solid ground: 
Japan is our most important ally in Asia. 
It is our second greatest trading partner 
• • • Our China and economic initiatives 
were a shock to the U.S.-Japanese rela­
tionship.7 
Nixon wandered into a mire however when he speculated 
that the American-Japanese relationship had, 
• • • already been overtaken by time and 
Japan's phenomenal economic growth. The 
shocks of 1971, therefore, only accelerated 
an evolution in U.S.-Japanese relations 
that was in any event, overdue, unavoidable, 
and in the long run, desirable. 8 
That the shocks may have been unavoidable on a cost-gain 
analysis, limited to their "natural ll aspects, is possible. 
That the shocks were either overdue or desirable has yet 
to be proven. 





A fifth important point made by President Nixon in 
his message to the Congress read to the effect that the 
Nixon administration would enjoy seeing a remilitarized 
and increased politicized role for Japan in Asia: 
Japan has long since acquired responsi­
bility for its own conventional defense. 
However (the President asks, speaking 
curiously in the past tense), Japan con­
tinued to rely on American nuclear power 
for strategic s.ecurity. It was, more­
over, prevented by constitutional, poli­
tical, and psychological factors, and by 
the attitudes of its Asian neighbors from 
projecting military power beyond its own 
borders~ Thus the l1utual Security Treaty 
continued to serve Japan's interests, as 
well as our own. Still, it was clear that 
changes would come in our defense relation­
ship as Japan regained its strength and 
pride. 9 
What is unclear is whether, as Japan regained "its 
strength and prideH and projected its "military power 
beyond its own borders," this would be done in the long-
term interest of the United States. 
Added to the inherent political, military and 
economic problems of Japan's expansion, is the problem 
of general Asian insecurity. Asia is a region of in­
stability (e.g., Indochina), fraught with struggles of 
anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, nationalism and 
socialism to name a few. The American withdrawal as in­
dicated in the Nixon doctrine, can only lead to further 
9Ibid., P • 340. 
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instability as the remaining po\Vers vie to better their 
respective positions. 
Another important factor of future Asian poli­
tics is that, of the world's current five Great Powers, 
four are committed in strength to the Asia-Pacific 
region. Only the European Community can be excluded. 
For the purpose of this paper, a distinction will be 
made between the terms trGreat Power" and "Superpower. 1I 
Of the five Great Powers (i.e., China, the European 
Community, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United 
States), only the latter two can be considered Super­
powers. Japan lacks Superpower status since it lacks 
a credible military, especially nuclear, establishment. 
Only the two Superpowers share global interests 
and responsibil~ties that include Asia. The possibility 
of a future domination by either Superpower of the Asian 
I 
region, even given the assistance of a third Great Power, 
would seem remote. This is because the global commit­
ments of the Superpowers makes it impossible to concen­
trate the totality of their power in anyone given area. 
It is also this "global factor ll that tends to limit and 
decrease the Superpower's superiority over any third 
power in a local conflict. 'Iihe inherent danger for a 
Superpower in overcommitting itself to anyone region 
at the expense of its global responsibilities is clear 
9 
(e.g., the u.s. in Vietnam: 1965 - 1969). 
Another factor which diminishes the influence of 
the Superpowers in dealing with either of the other two 
Asian Great Powers, is that they have their centers of 
power located at a distance far from Asia. This factor 
will probably be more important in the case of the 
united States, and less so in the case· of the Soviet 
Union through the 1970's. This is because while Soviet 
influence in the East is generally on the incline 
(e.g., India), the influence and support of the United 
States is on the decline. The reduction of American 
bases in Asia include not only those in Vietnam, but 
also numerous bases in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Japan. In addition, the assumption of Japanese 
restrictions of,. future American rights in the military 
use of Okinawa (the key base of American Pacific de-
I
fense), will mean a reduction of American military 
effectiveness in the region and a probable increase of 
friction in American-Okinawan (Japanese) relations. 
Nevertheless, it must remain clear that the 
Pacific Ocean acts in the twentieth century less as a 
barrier than as a conduit between the powers, making 
for a certain, if often confusing, overlapping of inter­
ests. Any change in the Asian balance of power whether 
positive or negative, opens new opportunities as well 
10 
as dangers to all the nations that share responsibili­
Ties in the Pacific area. 
Without doubt, one of the region's greatest dangers 
to peace is the Sino-Soviet dispute. This conflict 
carries within it a danger to regional peace since it 
has a high potential for disruption, while simultane­
ously carrying the greatest of potentials for destruc­
tion.It is somewhere within the center-range between 
these two hostile powers that Japan's foreign policy 
balances itself. Both China and the Soviet Union com­
pete for the security that an alliance with Japan would 
provide. In turn, the Japanese have made their posi­
tion on a definite comnitment to either side purposely 
unclear. Yet Japan may be forced into some stronger 
alignment in its policies, given the possibility of a 
further focusing of acuteness in the Sino-Soviet problem. 
The current problems between the Soviet Union and 
China are many of which territorial questions, ideologi­
cal differences, general deep-seated hatreds, mutual 
racial contempt, and a variety of age-old rivalries, 
are only a few. The question of a possible Sino-Soviet 
reconciliation in the near future is an open-ended one, 
and is represented by two schools of thought resting at 
opposite poles. China's current weakness in relation 
to the USSR (which in 1972 had some 44 army divisions 
11 
stationed on the China border representing over one-
quarter of the entire Soviet Army and representing 14 
more army division than were employed on the border 
in 1970),10 would probably indicate a concomitant weak 
.desire to negotiate with the Soviet Union until a 
significant power shift occurs. In any case, the 
problem will remain of paramount importance to the 
future foreign policy of Japan vis-a-vis China, the 
Soviet Union and the United States. 
Although any future co~~ination among Asia's four 
Great Powers is possible, the tie between Japan and the 
United States would seem the most stable (assuming that 
future "Nixon shocks" can be avoided). In contrast, the 
position of China and the U.S.S.R. seems to be least 
stable, with both countries having much to gain from 
any strong affiliation with a third Great Power. In 
East Asia the most likely and best choice for both 
countries is an affiliation with Japan. 
To a very large degree the future course of 
Japan's foreign policy will have a tremendous impact 
upon the balance of power in Asia. While in the past 
the Japanese could rely on American military protection 
10Taken from a report issued by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London. See Japan 
Times (May 3, 1972), p. 4. 
12 
at a time when they expanded economically, such an 
open alternative for the f~ture is increasingly doubt­
ful. With the American debacle in Vietnam winding down 
and the old American policy bf quasi-indiscriminate 
"';, ' 
force-application being partialry transformed into the 
application of accommodation, the 'Japanese (and others) 
are beginning to question the seriousness of American 
reliance and determination in its commitments to Asia. 
The Government of Prime Minister Tanaka is aware that 
any reduction of reliance in the U.S.-Japanese security 
agreement must mean an increased dependence upon some 
other Great Power (i.e., China or the Soviet Union), 
or upon themselves. 
CHAPTER II 
POLITICS IN THE POST-WAR ERA 
The history of modern democratic Japan emerged 
from the ashes of World War II. The victors of that 
war, or more specifically the Americans, grafted a 
variety of Western values and incentives on post-war 
Japan. Although the Emperor-system was not to be elimi­
nated as the Soviets vigorously suggested, the personal 
power and influence of the throne was to be sharply cur­
tailed, and the governmental structure was to be con­
formed more closely to democratic principles. Japan 
would be encouraged to develop and strengthen individ­
ual liberties, ~.emocratic organizations, and, later, a 
viable economy. In addition, Japan was to be de-mili­
,
tarized, both in terms of the internal leadership struc­
ture and in terms of relative international power. These 
reforms, accompanied by the implementation of others 
differing in scope but not objectives, were designed to 
mold Japan in such a way that would make impossible her 
straying from the path of peace in the future. 
The reforms that called for the de-militarization 
and democratization of Japan also declared that the 
Japanese people should forever renounce war as a 
14 
sovereign right. The threat or the use of force were 
to be discarded as a means for Japan to ever settle 
international disputes, and the Japanese people pledged 
themselves never to maintain air, sea or land forces 
or other war potential. All of these stipulations 
presumed at least two conditions: first, that the 
policy implemented from above by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (an alien organization), would 
take hold; and second, that the defense of the 
Japanese islands would henceforth be adequately pre­
served by American military power. These assumptions 
were to be critically tested in the 1970's. 
With the advent of the Cold War in 1948 the 
American occupation authorities began to move in a 
direction that was intended to see a rapid vitalization 
of the Japanese economy. Within two years, Japanese 
production had nearly returned to its pre-war levels. 
Simultaneously, a counterreaction to the re-birth of the 
economy emerged, both outside and within, the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP). The Communists increasingly 
assumed a role of opposition to the new course that the 
country was taking. The JCP felt that a rebuilding of 
the economy would eventually and inevitably lead Japan 
into a.new capitalist war. Ironically enough, it was 
the occupation's program of political emancipation that 
15 
provided an opportunity for the Communists to become 
l a significant force in Japanese politics. 
Peace was signed between the United States and 
Japan on September 8, 1950. While the united States 
favored coming to terms with Japan in a policy designed 
to rebuild the shattered economy. Russia favored puni­
tive action. The Soviet union felt, as did most other 
East Asian countries, that Japan should not be allowed 
to rebuild a strong economic base from which it could 
again economically and militarily expand. 
However, Japan was within the American sphere 
of control and the strong input of economic assistance 
that was needed prior to an economic rebirth was both 
allowed and provided. On the same day that the 
Japanese-American peace treaty came into effect (April 
28, 1952), Japan and the Nationalist Government on 
Taiwan signed a treaty of peace. At the time, this 
pact with the Nationalist Government of China: 
registered its faith that Japan had aban­
doned its imperialism and became an out­
post for the world's defense against com­
munism. Japan recognized Chiang Kai-shek 
as the sovereign authority in Formosa, 
1
Claude Albert Buss, Asia in the Modern World: 
A History of China, Japan, South and Southeast Asia 
(New York: ,Macmillan, 1964), p. 519. 
16 
the Pescadores, and the territories which 
might in the future come under his con­
trol. Japan was not willinq to endorse 
Chiang's sovereignty over the entire 
mainland. 2 
Throughout and beyond the 1950's and 1960's, 
.Japan was to emerge increasingly as both an economic 
power in Asia, as well as an economic power in the world. 
During this period of growth and to the present day, 
Japan has been ruled continuously by the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP). The platform of this basically 
conservative party has generally called for peace in the 
spirit of the United Nations and for a limited rearma­
ment to provide a means of "self-defense." The Liberal 
Democrats have historically looked unfavorably at atomic 
or hydrogen weapons, both for use by Japan itself, or 
by others from ,Japanese soil (i.e., the united States). 
The LDP has publicly favored both stronger economic ties 
I 
with the People's Republic of China, as well as a nor­
malization of political relations with both China and 
the Soviet Union. Increased trade with both China 
and the Soviet Union has become a strong element of 
Japanese economic life. 
Since the Second World War the main theme of 

Japanese politics has been that of the success of the 

2Ibid ., pp. 525-526. 
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Liberal Democratic Party in withstanding the challenges 
by all other parties to their domestic political domina­
tion. The Liberal Democrats have ideologically been 
the bitter foe of left wingism and of the Communists. 
Especially in the 1950's. but decreasingly in the 
1960's, the strongest party of the socialist movement 
has been the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). The 
Socialists could in the 1950's claim the allegiance 
of a great mass of the Japanese people. For a variety 
of reasons, however, the most obvious being the rising 
affluence of the average Japanese worker, the socialist 
movement has recently lost much of its support. In the 
1960's the greatest support for the JSP came from two 
groups: the Marxist-oriented students; and the two 
~ 
largest federations of labor unions.~ An important 
problem for the Socialists has been to tie these two 
divergent groups together in purpose and action. 
The JSP has also suffered from a variety of 
other difficulties such as a general lack of funds, 
failure to gain support from the growing middle class 
and party factionalism. The cleavages within the ranks 
of the Socialist party in 1959 were so sharp that a 
faction of rightists under Nishio Suehiro defected from 
3The Sohyo and the Zemo. 
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the main party to set up ,a separate party, the Demo­

cratic Socialist Party (DS~)~ The split of the DSP 

had come about following a refusal by the right wing 

of the JSP to accept a statement by the party's assumed 

. leader, Asanuma, made in Peking 'in 1959, which read to 
the effect that the Americans, as imperialists, were 
the common enemy to both Japan and China. 
Until the JSP-DSP split, the former had been the 
only significant left wing party in Japan. The three 
main ideological tenets of the JSP are: socialism, 
pacifism and nationalism. The thinking of the Socialist 
has been generally doctrinaire rather than pragmatic, 
and this has resulted in a basic antipathy towards 
capitalist co.untries, especially the United States. 4 
In general, the JSP has opposed American foreign policy 
in East Asia and its members have wanted to see Japan 
develop relations with North Korea and North Vietnam. 5 
4J • A. A. Stockwin, "Foreign Policy Perspectives 

on the Japanese Left: Confrontation or Consensus?" 

Pacific Affairs, Winter 1969-70, p. 441. 

SAS late as mid-May of 1972 the JSP had reiterated 
its foreign policy posi~ion in the Asia-Pacific region, 
calling for a neutral zone brought by an establishment 
of a collective security system. Incorporated within 
this would be the abrogation of all military alliances 
between the Asian nations including especially the Great 
Powers. This would also include the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from the Asia-Pacific region with the 
establishment of a blanket neutrality zone. See The Japan 
Time~, May 15, 1972, p. 2. 
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The Socialists have adopted a policy of "positive 
neutralism" and wish to avoid any military alliances 
which would commit Japan to another country. The policy 
of the JSP has been that Japan should stand outside the 
Western and Communist blocs, but should establish 
friendly relations with both. In this sense, the JSP 
has felt for some time that Taiwan is a part of China 
and that American military forces should be immediately 
withdrawn. In 1963 the party approved the partial 
nuclear test-ban treaty, thereby taking a stand approved 
by the West and the Soviet Union but condemned by China. 
A repeated cause for the factionalism that has 
plagued the Japanese S09ialist Party has been the failure 
of the party's moderates adequately to balance the 
extremists. There have been a number of splits in 
addi tion to the one in 1959 which created the DemocraOtic 
Socialist Party. Fot example, as early as 1948 the 
"Hirano-faction" split from the main Socialist body in 
January, as did the Nishio faction in July. Both of 
these factions were of the right wing, and both were 
reunited to the main body in 1952. A left wing faction 
also split away from the JSP in July of 1948, forming 
the Worker-Farmer Party in December. It was not until 
1957 at theDth JSP Convention that the Kuroda faction 
(i.e., the Worker-Farmer Party), was reunited with the 
20 
main body of Socialists. Another important break within 
the ranks of the Socialist party came in 1951 when the 
entire Socialist Party split intb the "Left-JSP" and 
"Right-JSP." A reunification was, however, affected 
in October of 1955. 
In 1965 the Socialists were dominated by the 
Sasaki faction which set the tone for the party's 
foreign policy in that decade. "This faction has re­
peatedly shown itself susceptible to being drawn into 
the pro-China position favored by members of the ex­
tremist 'Heiwa Doshikai' {Peace Friends Associati01)." 6 
The defection of the Communist Party of Japan in 1966 
from its former allegiance to Peking coincided with the 
trend in the Japanese Socialist Party "and was closely 
related to it. '''': 
An additional complication for Japanese Leftists 
I
has been the strong side affect exerted by the centri ­
fugal forces of the Sino-Soviet split. In 1968 the 
so-called "Yamamoto-Oshiba" group broke from the 
Sasaki faction (which in 1968 had been the predominant 
influence within the JSP). The position of the "Yamamoto-
Oshiba" group was less doctrinaire than that of the 






Sasaki faction, and wanted to support the policies of 
the Soviet Union at China' ~ e~pense.' Representing the 
Maoist line and resting at the opposite end of the 
party's political spectrum was the Heiwa Doshikai. 
In both 1969 and 1970 the Heiwa'6oshikai was increasingly 
attracting local activists in substantial numbers 
(which in turn would increase their strength at future 
party congresses). 
Following the Nixon visit to China, it became ap­
parent that the Japanese Socialist Party and the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) did not 
share similar views on the issues of either the China­
US rapprochement or Japan's moves to normalize Japanese­
Chinese relations. While recent members of the CPSU 
visiting in Japan (at JSP invitation) have remarked 
that the US-China communique, for example, will not 
ease tensions and was designed only to split the 
Communist bloc, members of the Japanese Socialist Party 
have said that the Nixon visit to Peking will help form 
the necessary conditions for a general "detente n in 
Asia. For the Soviets, the biggest fear in the immedi­
ate future is whether Japan might soon normalize rela­
tions with both China and North Korea (which would then 
lead to increased anti-Soviet feelings in Japan.) 
22 
The rise in popularity of the Japanese Communist 
Party to a prominent place. in, Japanese politics is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. During the 1950's and 
1960' s the Japanese Communis't Party (JCP) exerted less 
influence than the Socialists,' for the most part be­
cause the Communists have often been associated with 
the Soviet Union (whose earlier opposition to the 
Emperor-system, for example, has been noted). A 
general asset for the more recent popularity of the 
JCP in Japan has been its historical hatred for the 
policies of the United States. 
Since the beginning of Japan's post-war politics 
the Soviet Union has been looked upon with general dis­
approval. Several reasons can be identified with the 
Japanese attitude, the most obvious being the fear that 
many Japanese have held over the possible ties that may 
exist between the Communist Parties of Russia and 
Japan, and the implications that this could have in the 
political future of Japan. Also, the Japanese remember 
the Soviet attack on Japan in the last days of the war, 
and following its quick conclusion, Russian treatment 
of Japanese prisoners who, when finally repatriated, 
returned with II lurid tales of forced labor and brain- . 
\vashing." 8 A heavy influx of anti-Russian feelings 'were 
8Buss, p. 630. 
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provided by the repatriations since, according lito 
Japanese figures, approxi~t~ly 1,300,000 nationals, 
including civilians, had been incarcerated by the 
. 	 "9RUSS1ans • • • • However, in more recent times 
this fear has partly subsided; associated with the 
current Sino-Soviet split and the' relatively indepen­
dent position taken by the Japanese Communist Party 
on the matter. 
Unlike the Japanese Socialist Party, the Commun­
ist Party of Japan did not support the nuclear test 
ban treaty, and the JCP broke with Moscow in 1963 when 
the USSR signed the document. The Japanese Communists 
strongly opposed the treaty on the grounds that it was 
inflicted with Superpower arrogance. The rift between 
the JCP and Moscow was intensified by what the Japanese 
Communists regarded as the "meddlesome attempts by 
Moscow to turn a rebellious faction led by Yoshio 
Shiga, a longtime party member, into a splinter 
Communist party subject to Kremlin dicates. nlO In 
1966, the Japanese Communists refused to send delegates 
to the 23rd Soviet Congress. and in 1970 declined to 
9Robert D. Warth, Soviet Russia in World 
Politics (New York: Twayne Publishers,:rnc., 1963), . 
p. 	376. 
10The New York Times, !1arch 22, 1971, p. 11. 
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invite a soviet delegation to the JCP Congress, even 
ignoring ~1oscow's congratulatory message addressed to 
that meeting. 
With the Soviet friendship offensive of 1971 
aimed at Japan in general, it appeared that JCP-CPSU 
relations might improve. On March 2i, 1971, the 
Japanese Communist Party agreed to send a delegation to 
the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, which 
opened March 30, 1971 in Moscow. The agreement was 
reached by Tomio Nishizawa, a member of the JCP 
Presidium, who led a four-man team to Moscow to meet 
with Soviet Presidium member, Mikhail A. Suslov. But 
while party relations between the Soviet and Japanese 
Communists had shown improvements by March of 1972, the 
Japan-Soviet F~~endship Society appeared to be heading 
for a crisis with its director resigning and most of its 
other ranking officidls threatening to follow suit. The 
crisis followed a Soviet demand that former dissident 
members of the Japanese Communist Party be expelled from 
the Society. The Friendship Society had been important 
during the 1963-1971 period, serving as a channel for 
Japanese-Soviet cultural exchanges until the political 
thaw between the JCP and the CPSU in the Spring and Sum­
mer of 1971. 
25 
The Japanese Communist Party is the strongest 
Marxist party in non-Communist Asia and the best or­
ganized. Currently its membership numbers over 
300,000 and in Japan's 1969 general election, for exam­
pIe, it polled over 3.2 million votes. One observer 
has noted that the JCP "has been probably the most 
genuinely pro-Peking of all the Communist parties in 
the world • Its greatest weakness has been 
that it has been unable to mobilize massive Japanese 
public support for the Chinese cause. 
Diplomacy between Japan and China has been car­
ried out not on official levels, but rather through 
what the Chinese have called "people's diplomacy." 
This form of diplomacy exists at all levels other than 
official ones. It has been largely here that the JCP 
has been able to act on China's behalf within the 
Japanese domestic scene. 
Although the Japanese Communist Party has been 
closer to Peking than Moscow since 1963, the JCP's 
position since 1965 has still been one of basic neu­
trality. This has been partially due to increased 
Soviet wooing since 1965, and, also partially from the 
llvidya Prakasn Dutt, China's Foreign Policy, 
1958-1962 (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 
pp . 242 - 2 4 3 . 
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destruction of the Indonesian PKI (Communist Party), 
which made the JCP "unques,tionably'" the most important . . 
I ' C . t t' A' 12 Th JCP h d b non-ru 1ng ommun1S par y 1n S1a. e a een, 
shocked by the results of what was not 
entirely accurately t~en to be Chinese 
incitement of the PKI ," 'oy Chinese ob­
jections to 'united action' on Vietnam, 
by Mao Tse-tung's insistence that the 
Japanese Communists should seek power 
by armed struggle rather than parli ­
mentary methods. 13 
In 1966 the controversy between the Japanese Communist 
Party and the People's Republic of China was opened 
for public airing when the Japanese expressed their 
concern over I..fao' s "personal backing" against an effort 
by the JCP to strengthen the Communist position in Viet­
nam,and by improving Sino-Soviet relations. 14 
From the above examples, it can be seen that the 
Japanese Communist Party has not been simply a "camp 
follower" of either the Communist Party of Chi:na or 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1968, for 
example, the JCP had felt quite free publicly to criti ­
cize Moscow severely for the Soviet invasion of 
l2Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest 





l4 Ibid., p. 133. 
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Czechoslovakia, much as it had previously felt free to 
boycott Mao's preparations for an international con­
ference. The clamor in 1972 within Japan for improved 
China-Japan relations did not include the JCP. In 
fact, the Japanese Communists have been, since January 
of 1972, stepping up their attacks on the Mao Government 
in China. On the Chinese side, chairman of the JCP 
Miyamoto, "has been ranked along side American imperial­
ism,' Soviet revisionism and the reactionary Sato 
Cabinet as one of China's four enemies. HIS 
One observer has commented that the, 
Chinese leadership appears to feel a 
mixture of resentment and respect for 
Japan as a country whose armies with­
drew unbeaten from China in 1945 and 
has staged a phenomenal political and 
economic recovery from the depths of 
the period. 
In addition, Japan, 
would probably be welcome to Peking as 
. a junior political partner if it came 
under a government sufficiently anti­
American and far to the left, although 
not necessarily outright Communist. 16 
On July 5, 1972, the date of the JCP's 59th 
anniversary, the party was expected to issue a mani­
festo of a new political program,17 designed to envisage 
15The Japan Times, April 13, 1972, p. 14. 
l6H· 234~nton, p. • 
17The Japan Times, March 6, 1972, p. 3. 
28 

the creation of a "democratic coalition" government. 
The proposed coalition would consist mainly of the 
Japanese Socialists and Communists. In addition, the 
July manifesto was expected' to elucidate on the JCP 
attitude over the question of 
I 
~tie party's non-inter­
vention in the Sino-Soviet co~f11ct, the policy of 
independence, and non-interference by outsiders in 
its affairs. 
Thus, from about 1961, with the creation of the 
Chairman Nosaka and Secretary General Miyamoto faction 
and with the adoption of a platform that rejected the 
policy of seizing power by armed revolution; and in 
1963, with the creation and adoption of a policy of 
non-intervention in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the 
1964 explusion of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese 
members from the party; the Japanese Communist Party 
has since been able to maintain a relative independent 
position from a dominating influence by Communist parties 
of either the Soviet Union or of China. 
While the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese 
Communist Party both represent the nOld Left," the 
Komeito Party represents the "New Left.tI However, the 
Komeito does not take strong extremist views on Japanese 
foreign policy and the ncontent of its official views 
on foreign policy are close to the traditions of the 
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'Old Left. llIlS The Sokka,Gakkai, from which the 
Komeito broke away, has be~n.described as a: 
curious blend of religious revivalism and 
political activism'of undetermined direc­
tion which has made rather impressive 
political gains at th~, ~ocal level, but 
now seems to be receding as a political
force. 19 
As Japan's second largest opposition party, the 
Komeito is both militant and nationalistic and faith­
fully supported the Chinese admission to the United 
Nations. 20 On June 9, 1971, the Peoplels Republic of 
China invited the Komeito to send a party delegation to 
Peking. The invitation from China follo\ved by only one 
day the announcement by the Komeito Party Chairman, 
Yoshikatsu Tadeiri, that henceforth the Komeito would 
favor the recognition of Peking as the only qovernment 
of China. Tadeiri also said that the Komeito would now 
support the abrogation of the 1952 peace treaty between 
Japan and the Nationalist government on' Taiwan. 2l This 
18S k· 443, toc w~n, p. • 
19John F. Melby, uGreat Power Rivalry in East 
Asia," International Journal (Sununer 1971), p. 464. 
20The Japanese Communist Party also supported the 
Chinese admission to the United Nations, consistent with 
left wing attitudes, even though recent relations between 
the JCP and Peking have not always been good. See G."P. 
Jan, liThe Japanese People and Japan's Policy toward. 
Communist China,11 Western Political Quarterly (September 
1969), pp. 605-621. 
2lSee The New York Times, June 10, 1971, p. 14. 
30 
action moved the party significantly closer to the 
policies advocated by the,Japanese Socialist Party. 
The Komeito has historically been on bad terms with the 
Communist Party of Japan, although it does share certain 
similar characteristics with tbe JCP (e.g., both parties 
gain much of their political support from the urban 
proletariat). 
The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which split 
from the Japanese Socialist Party in 1959 (see pp. 17­
18), shares the same basic attitude as does the Komeito 
and the JSP over the question of Japan-China normali­
zation~ The Democratic Socialists have also accepted 
the three Chinese principals to be met prior to China 
entering into talks with Japan on the normalization 
question, i.e., that Japan recognize the People's 
Republic of China as the sole legal government represen­
ting China; that Taiwan is a part of China; and, that 
the Japanese-Naionalist China treaty be abolished. 22 
Recently,23 top-ranking Chinese officials, in­
cluding Premier Chou En-lai, have praised the new left 
wing elements in Japan, especially the more extreme 
groups such as the Rengo Sekigun (United Red Army). 
22The Japan Times, April 15, 1972, p. 14. 
23The Japan Times Weekly, April 22, 1972, p. 4. 
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Another extremist faction.praised and supported by 
Peking is the "Fukuda grou~,~ (not related to Foreign 
Minister Takeo Fukuda), which split from the Japanese 
Communist Party in 1966. 
It would appear that the present generation of 
young people in Japan are contented with their country's 
growing role in Asian and world affairs. The new genera­
tion of Japanese: 
are possibly less discontented with the 
structure of their society than young 
people anywhere. The new generation is 
genuinely internationalist-minded, with 
an almost desperate urge to be thought 
cosmopolitan. It is also vigorously 
proud of being Japanese, at least toler­
ant of the Emperor system and anxious 
that Japan play its rightful role as a 
great power. 24 
The students since 1967 have, however, caused certain 
problems for Japan's political structure. Hade conspi­
cuous by their use of violence, the Japanese students 
have faced the party in power (i.e., the Liberal 
Democratic Party), with the same kind of problems not 
uncommon to. advanced and industrial Western nations. 
For example, the students have attacked the foreign 
policies of both the Japanese and American governments. 
Nevertheless, they have also definitely opposed the 
24Frank Gibney, "The View from Japan," Foreign 
Affairs, October 1971, p. 102. 
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policies of the Japanese Communist Party, which has 
in turn labeled the stude~ts anarchists and Trotskyites. 
The most powerful party in Japan and the party that 
has ruled the country 'throughout the post-war period is 
~', ' 
the Liberal Democratic Party (D~P). The LDP is a vast 
coalition of basically conservati~e political cliques. 
The Liberal Democrats are committed to protectionism 
and trade and rice price support policies, which 
guarantee the conservative and rural vote. 
The "China question" of setting forth the condi­
tions for normalization, has been important since be­
fore the last decade. In the early 1960's, and as late 
as 1964, the former Primer1inister Ikeda and his party 
had been willing to go as far as risking a Taiwanese 
boycott and a, 
disruption of trade for the sake of 
improving trade relations with China 
and achieving what was virtually ide 
facto' recognition. It stopped short 
of diplomatic recognition under the 
formula of what was called a'separa­
tion of economics and politics. '25 
However, the coming to power of the Sato cabinet brought 
better relations between Japan and Taiwan at the ex­
pense of a significant improvement of Japanese relations 
with China. 
25F • C. Langdon, "Japanese Liber'al Democratic 
Factional Discord on China Policy," Pacific Affairs, 
October 1971, p. 404. 
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Although the Liberal Democratic Party under Prime 
Minister Sato has generally been hostile to the' People's 
Republic of China, a substantial body within the LDP 
has worked for improved relations between China and 
Japan. In the fall of 1968, the pro-Peking group within 
the LDP consisted of a combination of about 86 Diet 
members from both houses which called themselves the 
Asian-African Problems Study Group. This group of pro­
Peking Dietmen favored the recognition of Peking and its 
entry into the United Nations. It was felt that if 
the People's Republic of China gained admission to the 
United Nations, it would end that country's comparative 
isolation and would enoourage it to cooperate in peace­
ful ways with the rest of the world. 
As of Nov.ember of 1971, one-third of the entire 
Liberal Democratic Party strongly supported the posi­
tion of Taiwan, while a slightly larger group backed 
Peking. It has been the policy of the pro-Taiwan ele­
ment that, while Taipei rather than Peking should be 
recognized as the ureal" China, trade with Peking should 
continue as long as it does not interfere with either 
Japan-Taiwan relations or with Japan-U.S. relations. 
However, it has been the pro-Peking group among the LDP 
that seems to have won over the tacit support of the 
34 
so-called uncommitted members, particularly its younger 
elements. 26 
The group ,,,ithin the Liberal Democratic Party 
favoring an improvement of Tokyo-Peking relations was 
l' , 
led in 1970 by former Prime Hinister Aiichiro Fujiyama. 
On December 9, 1970, 
the newly established Dietman's League 
for the Normalization of Japan-China 
Relations had its inaugural meeting 
• • • By early 1971, the League 
claimed 379 members or 51 percent of 
the Diet • • • • 27 
The growing number of groups favoring the normalization 
of Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly 
frustrated and militant, especially in 1972, since their 
policy of recognition has, as of yet, not been supported 
by the ruling leadership of the Liberal Democratic 
Party. The more powerful of these diverse groups and 
organizations, to name only a few, include: the Japan 
International Trade Promotion Association, the Japan 
Dietman's League for the Promotion of China-Japan Trade, 
26Koj i Nakamura, "Changing Power Balance," Far 
East Economic Review, November 27, 1971, p. 8. --­
27~"lilliarn Saywell, "Japan's Role in the Pacific 
and China's Response,1t International Journal, Summer 
1971, p. 517. 
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the Japan-China Friendship Association, the Japan 
National Peace Committee, the Japan Red Cross Society, 
the Japan Science Conference, and the Asian News 
Service. 28 
The domestic rewards for Prime Minister Sato's 

policies, including the one that governed China rela­
tions, reached its height of public approval in 1969. 

In late December, 1969, Sato's ruling 
LDP won a smashing electoral victory, 
gaining a stronger grip on the Diet 
• while the opposition Socialists 
• lost 50 seats. 29 
By November of 1970, the political climate in Japan had 
. changed (see Table I). 
By October of 1971, in a national opinion poll, 





Part of the reason for the sudden collapse of 

Sato's domestic poli~ical support is that, 

Japan's current leadership is hardly in­

spiring. The Sato government has steadily 

played cautious international politics, con­

tent to follow the u.S. lead in most matters, 
28For a more complete list, see Jan, p. 612. 
29Walter LaFeber, "China and Japan: Different Beds, 




Nakamura, p. 8. 
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TABLE I 
POLITICAL PARTy 'STRENGTH IN JAPAN 
FOLLOWING THE NOVEr1BER 1970 
ELECT~ONS3l 
Lower House Upper House 
LDP 303 139 
JSP 91 63 
Komeito 47 24 
DSP 32 9 
JCP 14 7 
Others 3 6 
conservative to a fault. The Socialists, 
the major opposition party, are not only 
committed to a kind of high-buttoned shoe 
Marxism which flies in the face of Japan's 
economic reality but their Mao first, 
anti-imperialist foreign policy embar­
rasses the other opposition parties, in­
cluding the Communists. 32 
Regarding China, the Liberal Democratic Party's basic 
attitude had been until the Nixon trip to Peking, with­
out initiative, content to faithfully follow the direc­
tion set by the u.S. since early in the Cold War. 
To a great extent, however, the collapse of Sato's 
popularity has corne with the embarrassment of the sudden 
and unsuspected nNixon-China n shock. It has also meant 
3lnChina's New Diplomacy: A Symposium II,II 
Problems of Communism, XXII (January-February, 1972), 
p. 75. ­
32Gibney, p. 102. 
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for Japan a casting away, to a yet undetermined extent, 
from the Japanese-American alliance and the close ties 
of cooperation. In late 1971 it was reported that the, 
left-Socialists and most other non­
Communist opposition qroups-- which 
together drew 41.5 percent of the 
vote compared to 44.6 percent for 
the Liberal Democrats in the June 
Upper House elections-- not only 
favor accommodation with Peking but 
would terminate the American alliance 
'and united States' base rights in 
Japan and Okinawa. 33 
By October of 1971, following the ouster of Nationalist 
China from the United Nations and the total failure of 
Sato's support for the unpopular U.S. position, outside 
of Taiwan and possibly the United States, 
the impact of the UN decision appeared 
to be felt hardest in Japan, America's 
major ally in East Asia and Communist 
China's chief rival for influence in 
the region. 34 
Following the failure of Sato's pro-U.S. and pro-Taiwan 
position, the Prime Minister was subjected to a bitter 
attack by the four opposition parties, by labor unions, 
many businessmen, and a significant portion of his own 
party for having sided with the United States and the 
losing side. One Japanese official said: "For the first 
33The New York Times, August 9, 1971, p. 28. 
34 .
The New York Times, October 27, 1971, p. 1. 
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time since World War II we are losers," and the "Sato 
government is responsible for our siding with the 
losers. ,,35 
Following the Sato policy failure, the call for 
his ouster grew louder from the opposition parties and 
from many private citizens. The Japanese Socialist 
Party, for example, issued a statement which declared 
that the, 
deceptive assertion that the United states 
and Japan have maintained for 20 post-war 
years, that the Taiwan regime was the only 
legitimate government of China, has col­
lapsed by the action taken in the United 
Nations, and the containment policy direct­
ed at China has broken down. This repre­
sents the complete defeat of Japanese di­
plomacy concluded by the Sato government 
• • • the Sato government should resign 
immediately to take responsibility for its 
failure. 36 
Nevertheless, on the same day that the JSP statement 
was issued, the Sato 90vernment withstood two attacks by 
the four opposition parties in the Lower House by votes 
of 274 to 169 and 280 to 171. The following day the 
Sato government also survived an attack in the Upper 
House by a vote of 132 to 106. 
Sato's Foreign Minister, Takeo Fukuda, was his 
choice to replace him as Prime Minister. Sato's 
35Ibid • 

36 Ibid •. 
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retirement had technically meant he was giving up only 
his party post as President. If Fukuda had replaced 
him as Prime ~1.inister, it would have meant that Sato 
could have retained some influence in the government. 
The choice of Kakuei Tanaka by the majority of the 
Liberal Democratic Party to replace Sato meant a re­
jection of the latter's cautious politics. In addition, 
Sato's seal of approval on Fukuda for the post of Prime 
Minister probably turned out to be more of a liability 
than an asset. ' 
The choice of Tanaka was not inconsistent with 
the current trend in Japanese politics today. As in 
many Western countries, the leftward political trend in 
Japan is representative of the changing economic and 
social conditions and values. In part, the longevity 
of power by the ruling LDP has come with the failure 
of the left to create an ideological umbrella in which 
all the" opposition parties could gather under. This 
failure is also indicative of the lack of success thus 
far by the opposition parties to draw the necessary 
substance for political power from the various factional 
groups, citizens, and interests who often give only 
begrudging support to the Liberal Democrats. 
With oppositional disunity being a major problem 
neither the Democratic Socialist Party nor the Komeito 
40 
favor joining with any left wing elements of the other 
parties (e.g., the DSP will join with the right wing of 
the JSP but not with the Communists, which the JSP 
wants included).37 Two power coalitions as alternatives 
to the LDP are currently in the process of developing 
and growing in strengt~ first, the JCP and the left 
wing of the JSPi and second, a coalition of the Komeito 
and the DSP. In 1972, the three biggest cities in 
Japan were ruled by members of the JSP left wing or by 
Communist-backed candidates. One observation has gone 
as far to note that at Japan's current rate of urbaniza­
tion, the Japanese Communist Party could rule the 
country by 1979. 38 
37F t .. 4 9 ~ Eas Econom1C Rev1ew, March , 1 72, p. 32. 
38Ibid • 
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'" jt I 
Japan has since the Sino-Soviet split found itself 
searching for a new image and status in Asia. The 
American withdrawal and reduction of power finds Japan 
moving hesitantly forward- to fill some portion of the 
newly created vacuum. During the 1970's, Japan will face 
a number of important questions including: (1) the 
northern territories issue; (2) the Sino-Soviet conflict: 
(3) the Japan-China normalization issue: (4) the pro­
blem from limited American withdrawal in Asia; and, (5) 
the rapid rise of the Japanese economy. 
Japan has long since become an economic world 
power. In Asia, Japan is now the dominant economic 
force. This power, however, has not come without arous­
ing a great deal of fear and resentment. The Japanese 
abroad are often referred to as the "Yellow Yankees" or 
"Ugly Japanese. II At home it "has already become fashion­
able .•• to speak of 'Japan's special responsibility,' 
and 'special interests' in this area, 'the single 
destiny of the Asians,' and the like."l 
IR. Hutching, "Soviet Defense Spendinq and Soviet 




Although few'wou1d fail to concede the Japanese their 
rapid economic growth and strong influence in Asia, 
not all would go so far to say that the, 
expansion of Japanese monopoly capital 
in Southeast Asia is equally aimed at 
gaining economic benefits and political 
advantages. Tokyo is lined by mirages 
of a recreated 'co-prosperity sphere 
• • • .' 2 
To a large degree, it is a matter of perspective whether 
one chooses to see Japan's grbwth as sinister or positive 
in nature. In the defense of that country's policies, 
one could observe that "Japan has been called upon to 
play an increasingly important role in the global attempt 
to realize a peaceful and prosperous world community.,,3 
During the decade of the 1960's, the emphasis on 
Japan's trade was increasingly placed in the direction 
of the developed and Communist bloc countries. In 1960, 
47.6 percent of Japanrs trade went to developed countries 
and 	50.6 percent to less developed, while only 1.8 per­
. . 4 1cent went to Commun1st countr1es. By 969, those 
2' d 43Ib1 ., p. • 
3Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan and Southeast Asia in the 
1970's," Current History (April 1971), p. 200. 
4Hakusho Tsusho, "Japan Uinistry of International 
Trade and Industry White Paper on International Trade" 
(1970), p. 140. See Koji Taira, "Japan's Economic 
Relations with Asia," Current History:- (April 1971), 
p. 228. 
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figures had changed in that, 52.1 percent of Japan's 
trade now went to developep ~ountries, while only 
43.1 percent went to less developed. The amount going 
to Communist countries in 1969 had also risen to 4.8 
percent. More recently, the Japanese business community 
has been moving to strengthen economic ties with East 
Europe. 5 For the purpose of promoting increased trade, 
Japan has been attempting to establish bilateral pri­
vate economic committees with the countries of 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Such 
committees already exist between Japan and East Germany, 
Hungary and Bulgaria. 
TABLE II 
JAPAN'S TRADE COMPUTED IN THOUSANDS OF 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH CHINA, 
TAIWAN AND THE USSR6 
, 
1961 1962 1963 196/. 1965 1966 1967 
Japan-USSR 210.3 296.6 320.0 408.5 408.5 514.3 611.5 
Japan-China 47.5 85.5 137.0 310.4 469.7 621.0 557.7 
Japan-Taiwan 164.0 179.9 229.7 278.7 375.2 402.7 465.2 
5 
The Japan Times Weekly, Harch 13, 1972, p. 4. 
6Chae-Jin Lee, "The Politics of Sino-Japanese 
Trade Relations, 1963-1968,fI Pacific Affairs (Summer 
1969), p. 131. 
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The breakdown of Japan's' trade with three of its 
major partners illuminates several factors. One factor 
is that the greatest increase of trade during this period 
occurred between Japan and China. Moreover, while trade 
between Japan and both the USSR and Taiwan experienced 
a steady annual increase, trade between Japan and China 
in 1967 showed a marked drop. This sudden decrease in 
trade volume can be explained in part, not exclusively in 
terms of Japan-China relations, but also in terms of 
the general Chinese withdrawal throughout the world, 
due to the Cultural Revolution. It has always been the 
Chinese practice to exert influence on Japanese domestic 
politics through its commercial contacts. Japan's 
trade with China from 1967 to 1971 indicat~s two 
further factors. 
TABLE III 
JAPAN'S EXPORT-IMPORT TRADE WITH CHINA 
COMPUTED IN THOUSANDS 70F MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Japanese exports 288.3 325.4 390.8 568.9 577.6 
Japanese imports 269.4 224.2 234.5 253.8 322.2 
Total Japan/ 
China Trade 
557.7 549.6 625.3 822.7 . 899.3 
7Toshitaro Fukushima, "Politics Not in Command," 
Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 44. 
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First, beginning in late 1968 or early 1969, 
Japanese-Chinese trade sho~ed. a marked increase; and 
second, throughout this period, Japanese exports to 
China have greatly exceeded imports. Japan's exports 
f,', ' 
to Taiwan have also usually exceeded" imports. In the year 
1969, for example, out of a total of $700 million in 
trade, $517 million consisted of Japanese exports to 
Taiwan. 
Without question the most important problem that 
has arisen from the excess ratio of Japanese exports 
over imports has not come in the case with Taiwan, but 
has occurred with the united States. On Mar~h 1, 1972, 
united States Secretary of the Treasury, John B. 
Connally, preqicted that the u.S. would incur a $1,800 
million to $2,000 million deficit with Japan in 1972 
despite the new realignment of currencies brought about 
in the previous year. In 1971, the total u.S. deficit 
had reached a record $3,206 million,8 and had brought 
8. h .From.January t rough May of 1972, the Un1ted 
States had already incurred the greatest deficit for 
any given year in its history. With seven months still 
remaining in the year, the deficit was still rising be­
yond the $3200 level (although the positive effects from 
President Nixon's economic policies would probably not 
be felt until later in the year). 
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about President Nixon's new economic policy. On 
December 18, 1971, the American initiative known in 
Japan as the "dollar-shock" brought about a revaluation 
of the Japanese yen which reportedly cost Japan's 
businesses and industrial interests in the first four 
9months of 1972 over four billion dollars. 
Since the yen nupvaluation," Japanese industries 
have been diversifying, no longer depending heavily on 
America as an export market. 10 For example, Japanese 
exports to the United States for the month of March, 
1972, was $817,680,000, up 19.4 percent from a year ago. 
But for the same month, Japanese exports to West Europe 
was $447,620,000, up 25 percent from a year ago, while 
Japanese exports to the Communist countries for March 
totaled $152,400,000, up 31.5 percent from a year ago. 
Nevertheless, the United States was expected to continue 
to press for further liberalizations of trade and 
capital transactions with Japan. ll 
The Nixon revaluation, or "dollar-shock," helped 
to further the Japanese recession. Japan's Gross 
9The Japan Times Weekly, April 15, 1972, p. 8. 
10Ibid., April 22, 1972, p. 9. 
11.The Japan:. Times, l-1arch 2, 1972, p. 9. 
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National Product suffered a major drop in 1971 for the 
first time since the recession year of 1965. It was 
reported in April of 1972 that the "Japanese economy is 
still in trouble as it enters the fiscal year 1972. 
The recession is now in its twentieth month • 
The Gross National Product for 1971 was up only 6.1 per­
cent in real terms. The annual growth rate since 1966 
has normally ranged from 10 percent to 14 percent. The 
official "low" prediction for fiscal year 1971 ending 
on :r.larch 31, 1972, was 4.3 percent, the lowest since 
1955. 13 
The maior economic problem between America and 
Japan has been that Japanese exports to the United 
states have exceeded imports. This problem has created 
a surplus of American dollar reserves in Japan. For 
Japan, the question has been how to increase imports 
I 
without worsening the domestic recession. Inactivity 
at arriving at some conclusion by the Japanese could 
wreck the delicate balance of the international mone­
tary system. The problem for the united States has 
been, and is, how to be more competitive in the world 
market. 
l2The Japan Times Weekly, April 15, 1972, P. 4. 
l3The Japan Times, March 2, 1972, p. 1. 
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Japanese foreign reserves with all foreign coun­
tries were, by the end of 1971, figured to be $15,235 
million. By the end of 1972, that figure could reach a 
total of over $20,000 million, and by 1973 over $30,000 
million. 14 In comparison, the United States in 1971 
held only $12,000 million in foreign reserves. Also by 
comparison, Japan's overall balance of payments during 
fiscal 1971 recorded a surplus of $8,043 million, over 
four times that of 1970. Japan today holds more foreign 
currency reserves than any other country in the world 
except West Germany. The build-up of foreign reserves 
in Japan will probably make Tokyo the eventual major 
money market in Asia. 
Japan has become the Soviet Union's major trading 
partner outside of the Soviet bloc and Japan is now the 
maior worldwide trading partner of the People's Republic 
of China. At the same time, Japan's major trading part ­
ner is still the United States, which absorbs about 30 
percent of all Japanese exports. During the 1960's and 
1970's, Japan also developed a strong economic relation­
ship with the smaller countries of Asia. At the Asian 
Development Conference held in Jakarta in April of 1970, 
Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi revealed that 
l4Far Eastern Economic Review, Harch 4, 1972, p. 33. 
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Japan was prepared to aid the smaller countries in Asia 
by offering them 1 percent of Japan's total income 
(i.e., $1.8 billion).15 
Also during the 1960's, Japan's Gross National 
Product more than tripled and with the real annual eco­
nomic growth rate averaging approximately 12 percent, 
Japan moved past both West Germany and the People's 
Republic of China to become the world's third most 
productive state. For the future l new markets as well 
as new discoveries of natural resources will be needed, 
and Japan has already assumed a major role in both trade 
and ~nvestment in all of Asia including both Taiwan16 
and South Korea. By the mid-1970's, assuming Japan 
sustains its current economic pace and that the rest of 
Asia continues to grow at its present rate, Japan's 
Gross National Product will virtually equal that of 
all other Asian nations combined. 17 During 1969, Japan 
l5Myung-Kun Yiu, liThe Prospects of Japan's 
Rearmament," Current History (April 1971), p. 234. 
l6 rn March of 1971, Japan's investment in Taiwan 
totaled $634 million. 
1971, p. 14. 
See The New York Times, 
-­ -­ -­
March 3, 
17 k' .Wa a~zum~, p. 200 • 
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led the world in trade exp~nsion growing at a rate of 
23.7 percent, compared to ~ne.world average of 13.5 
percent. At Japan's normal expansion rate of about 
12 percent (assuming that the "Nixon dollar-shock" 
, 
18"recession wears off soo~, the Japanese could over­
take the economy of the Soviet union by the late 1970's. 
H. Kitamura attempted to explain Japan's growth 
rate by theorizing that a high rate of growth in manu­
facturing products causes a rapid growth of both pro­
ductivity and employment in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. 19 However, once the investment sector is 
fully developed and once a large share of the, world 
trade in investment goods has been acquired, the growth 
rate is bound ,to recede. Kitamura predicts that he, 
would grant that Japan still has the 
possibility of economic growth at a 
rate of over 10 percent a year for 
some time to come (but, he adds), I 
am • • • inclined to predict that the 
time will come relatively soon when 
the single-minded pursuit of economic 
l8According to a leading private economic research 
institute in Japan (The Nornura Research Institute of 
Technology and Economics of Tokyo), the current 'recession 
should soon end. By 1974, the Japanese economy should 
again enter into another boom period at a growth rate 
of 11.3 percent, lasting until about 1976. See The 
Japan Times, Harch 23, 1972, p. 14. 
19H• Kitamura, "Japan's Economic Growth and its 




growth in the purely quantitative 
sense has to be modified. 20 
From about 1955 on, Japan experienced a national 
economic boom which was centered in heavy industry, 
chemicals, and, to a lesser extent, the technological 
industries, especially electronics. Following the 
American "hints" leveled at Japan to begin directing 
the building of military hardward, certain Japanese 
industrialists and businessmen revolted against the 
production of military goods and rather toward the pro­
duction of quality items, shifting away from the massive 
export market and towards the Japanese consumer market. 
However, if the Japanese economy is to switch from other 
forms to luxury consumer goods, it will have to provide 
for its workers the increased wages necessary to buy them. 
In 1971, the real gain in Japanese worker's incomes rose 
21by only 3.9 percent, tme smallest increase in six years. 
The switch from quantity to quality, and from 
heavy and chemical industries of mass production to 
highly sophisticated and knowledgeable industries, is not 
the only economic problem Japan faces. Other questions 
of social reform that the economy of Japan must answer 
20Ibid., p. 198. 

21The Japan Times t'1eekly, Iviarch 4, 1972, p. 8. 
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are: environmental pollution, structural reform of the 
educational system, 1iber~lization of imports, fu1fi1­
ling the expanding needs for raw materials, energy re­
sources, and foreign markets; and, a settlement of the 
labor shortage, rice surplus, and judicial and party 
political struggles. In the past, Japan has been one of 
the world's worse offenders of water, air and land 
pollution. 
The worsening pollution of air and water 
has resulted from exclusive concentration 
on the immediate, quantitative expansion 
of industry, coupled with disreqard for 
the consequences of industrial wastes and 
other pollutants on the environment. 22 
The expanding needs for economic resources pose 
strategic problems for Japan's policy makers. For 
example, Japan is the world's greatest importer of 
natural resources. Since 1965 the Japanese demand for 
resources, in a world where the total supply is limited, 
has risen from 10 percent to 20 percent each year.23 
In 1970, 44.3 percent of all Japanese imports were in 
the form of-raw materials. From 55 percent to 75 per­
cent of all copper, lead, and zinc, as well as all 
aluminum, nickel, petroleum and uranium had to be 
22 ..Far Eastern Econom1c Rev1ew, March 4, 1972, p: 50. 
23see The Japan Times Weekly, April 22, 1972, p. 12. 
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imported. Japan currently depends on oil for 70 per­
cent of her energy needs (by contrast, the u.s. depends 
on oil only 40 percent). Prime Minister Sato has 
suggested that Japan's greatest problem for the next 
30 years will be fuel supply.24 
Currently Japan has enough oil stockpiled to last 
only 45 days without resupply. The Japanese search for 
petroleum has nearly reached the point of desperation. 
One suggested possible solution for this problem calls 
for a direct oil agreement with Iran. The effective­
ness of this suggestion is limited in that it does not 
answer the age-old problem of supply~ given international 
hostilities. Japan has also probed, as a second pos­
sibility, the gaining of access to Alaskan oil. The 
consortium formed by the several oil companies to 
build the trans-Alaska pipeline,however, has denied 
25that any oil from the North Slope will go to Japan. 
An encouraging report was that an underseas oil field 
containing a quantity of low sulfur oil had been dis­
covered along the continental shelf in the Sea of Japan. 26 
24}.'he New York Times, April 9~ 1972, p. I; Section 
III. 
25The Japan Times, nay 13, 1972, p. 4. 




Another possible solution may come from the 59 
nuclear plants which are e.~p~cted to be functioning 
by the year 1985. 27 By 1990, over half of Japan's power 
needs could be met by nuclear power; by the year 2000, 
71 percent. However, this doe~' not necessarily anS\ver 
the question of the source of raw materials, i.e., 
these suggestions are limited only to altering the type 
of material needed (from petroleum to uranium). 
It has been suggested that by 1975 Japan's eco­
nomy may become larger than the combined gross national 
product of West Germany and the United Kingdom com­
28bined. Kitamura has also predicted that, while 
Japan's foreign investment balance at the end of 1968 
was slightly less than $2,000 million, indications are 
that by 1975 Japanese foreign investments will rise to 
a level of $20,000 million. By 1980, that figure may 
rise again to the new height of $100,000 million. The 
fact that Japan started at such a lotH' economic point 
some twenty-five years ago and has risen so far growing 
so fast, will cause in the future severe economic ad­
justments throughout the entire world. 
27Far Eastern Economic Review, March 18, 1972, 
p. 	52. 
28K1"tamura, p. 199 • 
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Herman Kahn29 has predicted that by the year 2001, 

Japan will be the world' s pre-em~.l.nent economic po""er. 

He has also predicted that by 1990 Japan's per capita 









Low Official l-1.edium Bigh 
1970 200 200 200 200 

1975 300 330 350 400 

1980 450 550 600 750 

1985 600 825 1000 1300 

2000 1500 2000 3000 4500 

Given in billions of 1970 dollars. 
At any rate, the future of Japan's economic ex­
pansion 'ivill be significant. In addition, some pro­
portional increase in Japanese political influence can 
also be expected. The possibilities of an expanded 
Japanese military role in Asia is the sub;ect for the 
29Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: 
Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice­
Hall, 1970-)-. ­
30
Taken from Herman Kahn and lvlax Singer, "Japan 
and Pacific Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No.4 
(April ·1971), p. 409. 
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following chapter. The, 
challenge to Japan ·of·the new inter­
national situation is to search for 
policies and behavior compatible with 
her position as a responsible member 
of the international community, and 
the community of industn~ally advanc­
ed countries in particular. The ex­
tent to which Japan may' cooperate in 
the task of expanding world trade and 
investment in a stable manner will de­
pend critically on whether the outside 
. world is prepared to treat her as an 
equal partner, respecting her own 
legitimate interests. 3l 
At the same time it is possible that, 
Japan once again may adapt herself too 
well to the po\Ver play of new imperial­
ism as an efficient subcontractor of 
the worldwide socio-economic and poli­
tical engineering initiated and managed 
by the West. Japan's diplomatic im­
maturity is well-known • • • Japan 
looks down upon her Asian neighbors. 32 
31 . . 2 2Kltamura, p.O. 
32T . 230a~ra, p. . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE QUESTION OF REMILITARIZATION 
.Until the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine in 
1969, the Japanese experienced the best of all possible 
worlds. They sat protected under the U.S. nuclear um­
brella, expanded their economy at the world's fastest 
growth rate, made plans to develop an important mili­
tary force, and traded profitably with China as well as 
with Peking1s most hated enemies: Taiwan, the Soviet 
Union and the united States. Since about 1969, however, 
Japan has been searching for a new role, one that will 
be acceptable to her people and government, and to the 
peoples of Asia including China, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States. With the one possible exception of 
the U.S., probably every country in Asia opposes and 
fears (to some degree) the remilitarization of Japan. 
In part, the American role in Asia has been to act 
as a buffer between the other Asian Great Powers. An 
example of this is the less than 40,000 American troops 
stationt:d in South Korea. With t.he American presence 
in the southern part of the Korean pennisula, it is· 
doubtful that a combination of any two Great Powers could 
successfully combine against a third. 
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It is a stark reality of Asian power 
that China and Rus'sia would .prefer the 
American presence on ~he Korean penin­
sula to the Japanes'e. Given a choice 
between Japanese militarism and 
American militarism, the Chinese and 
Russians would choose the latter any 
time. 1 
Perhaps the most important long-term question for 
Asian politics is concerned with the extent to which 
Japan will, in the future, remilitarize. Opinions on 
the subject vary from one extreme to the other. One 
observer has speculated that an, 
examination of Japan's current inter­
national position and of her relations 
with her three largest neighbors-- the 
united States, the Soviet Union, and 
China-- suggest that the Japanese have 
neither the capability nor the inten­
tion of assuming a major political­
military role and that close, coopera­
tive £ies ~ith the United States contirtue 
to be t2e basis of their foreign 
policy. 
Another observer saw the response to Nixo'n' s 
"dollar-shocks" of mid and late 1971, among both left 
and right in Japanese politics, as a sign that the 
united States was getting weak, and that Japan would in 
IHahm Pyong-choon, "Korea and the Emerging Asian 
Power Balance," Foreign Affairs (January 1972), p. 348. 
2Martin E. Weinstein r "Japan and the Continental 
Giants," Current History, (April 1971), p. 193. 
59 

turn be forced to rearm. "The centre, however, which 
may for these purposes be taken to be the main body of 
the Liberal Democratic Party does not share the inter­
pretation of the extremes.,,3 A third view felt it, 
is essentially the lack of a cultural 
consensus as to the acceptable mode in 
which the balance of power is to be 
maintained among the Asian powers (the 
Soviet Union, China and Japan) that 
makes the prospect of international 
peace and stability in East Asia rather 
bleak. 4 
Perhaps no one in Asia, including the Japanese, knew in 
mid-1972 the future limits of their remilitarization. 
The official government position on the question has 
been made clear a ntmmer of times. For example, in an 
article for the Jiyu Shimp05 (the organ of the Liberal 
Democratic Party), in early June of 1972, Foreign 
Minister Fukuda said that Japan should stay economically 
strong but should never try to become a "military power. II 
Specifically, a number of input factors are im­
portant to Japanese military-political considerations. 
Some of these factors are: the fear generated by the 
united States withdrawal in Asia; the demands of Japan's 
3"Right and Left Both See Rearmament," Economist, 
August 28, 1971, p. 27. 
4
Pyong-choon, p. 344. 

5­
See The Japan Times, June 7, 1972, p. 5. 
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giant and modernized middle-class style economy; the 
mOdern history of Japan, usually finding it closely as­
sociated \vith a major world power; the fact that one-
third of the present population was born after the 
Second World War; the elements of Japanese nationalism 
and a desire for big power status; the general instabil­
ity in East Asia; that approximately 35 percent of all 
Japan's trade is with Asian countries; that the eco­
nomic life of Japan depends upon open sea lanes; that 
there exists an expressed fear of Russian naval expan­
sion; the importance of the growing power of the 
Japanese military-industrial complex; and finally, the 
constant need of Japan for an access to raw materials. 
Since Japan must import nearly all needed fuels 
and minerals, an important element of weakness is the 
need for open access to raw materials and free access 
, 6 
to the sea lanes. This raises the important question as 
to the degree of public acceptance of increased 
Japanese "protectionism" over their economy by military 
means. 
Undoubtedly, a general feeling of national 
confidence has accompanied the economic boom, 
and there is a distinct danger of rising 
chauvinistic nationalism. ~·1ishima I s suicide 
was symptomatic of this, as is the enormous 
6See pp. 52-54 of this paper. 
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proliferation of ultra-right-wing or­
ganizations (some 400 with more than 
120,000 members). There has also been 
an increase in militaristic publica­
tions; and the controversies over 
educational policies. and the restora­
tion of Shintoism are other signs of 7 
the changing psycholog.:t'CiilJ. atmosphere. 
Although only the Japanese Socialist Party among 
the four major Opposition parties argues that Japan should 
not have an armed force, few elements within Japanese 
society seem to favor an extended re-militarization. The 
younger generation still seems determined that Japan can 
be a modern Great Power without having to become a mili ­
8tary one. The "Japanization" of Asian security appeals 
neither to the majority of the Japanese public nor to 
9
the majority of the country's business sector. It is 
difficult to find any significant units of opinion out­
side the vocal right wing extremist groups who support a 
major military build-up in Japan. This attitude is par­
ticularly expressed by the Opposition parties. For exam­
pIe, while questioning Prime Minister Sato in the Diet on 
February 28, 1972, Junya Yano, Secretary General of the 
7
T. C. Rhee, IiJapan: Security and Hilitarism,tI 
World Today (September 1971), p. 395. 
8Gibney, p. 103. 
9zbigniew Brzezinski, "Japan's Global Engagement," 
Foreign Affairs (January 1972), p. 274. 
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Komeito, "expressed doubt if it is desirable that Japan 
continue its defense build-up when the U.S.-China rap­
. . . . •• 10prochement prom~ses to reduce tens~ons ~n As~a. 
Sato replied that Japan should have a capability to de­
fend itself only to the point that it does not pose a 
threat to other countries. 
The first one-half of the year 1972 was rocked by 
a series of "after-shocks" following, and related to, the 
American withdrawal in Asia and the resultant shift in 
the balance of power. The primary question for Japan's 
role in Asia has been linked to the question of military 
rearmament. There has been a heavy influx of agitation 
and opposition to the continued military build-up in the 
country. In the ~iet, where many of these verbal battles 
have been fouqht, a sample survey over a two-month 
period, beginning in mid-February and lasting to mid­
April, discloses no fewer than four major political 
struggles. 
The first such political struggle arising as an 
"after-shock" from the question of the newly expected 
remilitarized role for Japan was probably the most signi­
ficant on a long-term basis. Beginning on February 8, 
1972, the Opposition parties paralysed the Diet over the 
10The Japan Times lve,ekly, ~larch 4, 1972, p. 4. 
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question of the amount of .money requested in the 1972 
defense bill. The paralys~s of the Diet lasted for 18 
days. Finally, on February 26, the Diet voted unani­
mously to significantly cut the amount requested for 
~', " .
defense. 
The second example occurred' on March 9, 1972, 
when Japan awoke to the glaring newspaper headlines: 
"GSDF Unit 'Sneaks' into Tachikawa Base Under Cover of 
Night. nll The immediate question was over some eighty 
members of the Japanese Army (Ground Self-Defense 
Forces), who had in a surprise move, occupied the vacant 
u.s. Tachikawa Air Base early the previous morning. 
What had apparently upset the local population (the mayor 
had hired soundtrucks urging the populace to protest the 
action), was that a previous survey conducted by the 
Tachikawa Municipal Government in 1971 showed that 82 
percent of the citizens opposed the use of the base by 
the GSDF. 12 
l'lThe Japan Times, March 9, 1972, p. 1. 
12Ibid ., March 18,1972, p. 2. In addition, the 
SDF in Japan are barely past the status of a public em­
barrassment. ~lost Japanese continue to think that a 
strong economy and a unified society are worth more than 
numerous divisions. liThe need for armed forces may be 
understood by some, but not by many. II See Gibney. · 
p. 108. 
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At the same time that the local Tachikawa Govern­
ment \vas arguing wi th the Defense Agency, the Opposition 
parties within the Diet had been angered by another an­
nouncement of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) that the 
agency had carried 120 tons of equipment to Okinawa in 
preparation for reversion on May 15. Without first 
obtaining the approval of the National Defense Council 
(i.e., the supreme civilian body supervising defense 
affairs), a commercial freighter had been loaded, ap­
parently in secret, on March 7. When the Diet dis­
covered the incident three days later, the issue quickly 
became a question of military versus political power. 
On March 13, the Director General of the Defense Agency, 
after previously threatening to resign, "froze" the 
supplies on Okinawa and ordered their return to Japan. 
The government also promised to IIreshuffle" those 
, 13 
Defense Agency personnel concerned. 
l3rn addition to the already existing problems 
over Okinawa reversion, the secret transfer of SDF 
supplies to that island created new ones. Those 
Okinawians who belonged to reformist groups stepped up 
their protests against the deployment of SDF units on 
the island, while even those who supported the station­
ing of the SDF on their island "have been confused by 
the clandestine transfer. 1I See The Japan Times, 
March 14, 1972, p. 3. 
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The last major political incident to upset the 
country in this short two-month survey period was 
raised by a Socialist Dietman on April 13, when he dis­
closed what he claimed was a classified telegram of the 
.p • 
u.s. Navy Department which read that the u.S. and 
Japan had recently held talks towards creating a "naval 
bilateral nuclear force.,,14 The U.S. Embassy responded 
that the alleged plan for 'the force was a "faked docu­
ment," and Prime Ministerlsato catagorically denied 
that Japan and the u.s. hid held such talks. 
What exists in Japal1 today are two basically con­
flicting trends. On the +ne hand is a strong public 
fear over the question of iremilitarization. This fear 
is generally held by the ~sses as well as most moderates 
and intellectuals. They feel that the best policy for 
Japan is neutrality. Par~doxically, this elem~nt also 
supports, to a certain de$ree, Japan's rearmament but 
only for means of limited "self-defense." The problem 
is that first group, who comprise the majority in Japan, 
have no clear-cut concept of what limits are defined 
by the term "defense." This confusion makes the group's 
position easily exploitable by the minority who arti­
culate the second view in Japan today: complete 
l4 Ib•;d., Apr1'I 14 , 1972 , p. 1 • 
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remilitarization. This second group is small in numbers, 
but tightly knit in unity of discipline and purpose. In 
addition, the second group of, 
industrial and financial circles have 
combined with the conservative wing of 
the ruling LDP to form what is tanta­
mount to an 'industrial-political­
military complex' for the apparent 
purpose of translating the new eco­
nomic strength into the politico­
military ~phere.15 
The policy of the second group has been to gain the 
complete remilitarization of Japan, to be accomplished 
through two means: first, the gaining of increased 
public support; and second, the increasing of influence 
within the government•. Success in this dual policy has 
been slower to come in gaining public support than in 
increasing influence within the government. Muchof the 
representative elements in this second group are to be 
found in the more extreme right wing factions of the 
I 
LDP. Moreover, the group has sufficient strength among 
the Liberal Democrats to influence Japan's foreign 
policy and military build-up in justification of its 
economic interests. 
At the end of the Second World War the entire 
country, including the big trusts (i.e., the "zaibatsun ), 
15Rhee, p. 391. 
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lay in complete ruin. As part of the democratization 
of Japan, the "zaibatsu" were to be either reduced or 
eliminated. This was necessary, it was felt, since the 
big Japanese trusts concentrated too much power in the 
hands of a few and were judged partially responsible as 
a prime factor in the political decisions leading to war. 
Many Japanese and foreign commentators charge today that 
the old "zaibatsu" are not dead, only revived. For 
example, such "zaibatsu" as the nKeidanren" and the 
16IINichikeiren" now publicly speak for Japan's rearmament. 
The reasons given center not unexpectedly on the need 
for Japan to militarily safeguard its economic interests. 
There are, however, some distinctions between the 
"zaibatsu" of the post-war period and the trusts of 
the pre-war period. The most important change, accord­
ing to Shozo Hotta President of the Sumitomo Bank and 
senior member of the core of the nzaibatsu" (the 16 
presidents of the "White Water C1ub n), is that among 
the post-war groups the holding company has disappeared. 17 
The significance lies within a more independent manage­
ment and a greatly reduced vertical control. Among other 
16 
Yiu, p. 235. 
17 .
The New York Times, March 26, 1971, p. 1, 8. 
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changes in today's "zaibatsu" are that: paternal 
authority has diminished, public ownership is now 
included, and, society in modern Japan is more de­
centralized. Nevertheless, and perhaps most important, 
is that "zaibatsu" has become today strong enough to 
influence the government of Japan toward greater mili-, 
tary spending. lS 
Although the "remilitarists" mayor may not have 
succeeded in yet swaying public opinion to their favor, 
it is not the public who makes national policy on a day-
to-day basis. An example in the revival of an old spirit 
was felt in Tokyo on October 31, 1971, when the SDF, 
celebrating their 21st anniversary, marched in review 
befofe Prime Minister Sato. Parading to a variety of 
! 
imp~sse~ foreigners and natives were groups,
t 
!f infantry, ranger and parachute troops, 
tn battle dres~, and of white capped sea­
~en, airmen in blue helmets, cadets from 
the military academy that trains officers 
from all three services, and smartly turned 
out companies from the army's women's and 
nurses corps. Rumbling along behind on 
this sunny Sunday morning were medium and 
heavy tanks, trucks towing howitzers and 
missiles, engineer vehicles carrying res­
cue boats and portable bridges, and a 
reconnaissance troop in speckled camou- 19 
~.~ uniforms aboard Honda motorcycles. 
~! ! 

~ ~~a:Yjif;~""Ir. "23'5'. 

19The New York Times, November 1, 1971, p. 3. 
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Japan is currently engaged in the Fourth Five Year 
Defense Plan, first announced on April 27, 1971, and ex­
pected to run through 1977. The Fourth Defense Plan is 
nominally limited by the same considerations that limited 
its predecessor, the Third Five Year Defense Plan. Both 
plans declared that defense capabilities should be 
enhanced in all three services, limited by domestic 
production and achieved with a minimal impact on the 
economy_ Japan, however, 
can be expected to take certain pre­
cautionary steps to assure herself an 
intermediate degree of security: (i) 
continued expansion of the Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) , especially their naval 
and air components; (ii) continued re­
search into missiles and nuclear energy; 
(iii) further steps towards a massive 
armaments industry, if and when it 
should become necessary: and (iv) the 
preparation of public opinion for these 
measures. 20 
The new Defense Plan is to become effective on 
April 1, 1972, and made Japan the seventh largest 
spender on defense in the world, following the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China, West Germany, France, and Great Britain. It 
also represents a 220 percent increase over the old 
outlay, and calls for an increase in the army from 
20Rhee, pp. 390-391. 
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260,000 men to 271,000 men,-an increase in the number 
of tanks to 990, the constl:~ction of two 8, OOO-ton 
helicopter-carrying escort vessels, and the construc­
tion of fourteen high-speed mis~,~le carriers and 61 
" . 
other naval craft which will almpst double the present 
size of the Japanese navy in total tonnage (i.e., from 
144,000 tons to 247,000 tons).2l In addition, the 
Fourth Defense Plan would acquire for Japan 170 new 
F4J Phantoms22 and urges the purchase of 920 new planes 
23
including 80 supersonic jet trainers. 
Although the more general reactions from the two 
feuding Communist Asian giants to Japan's recent power 
ambitions in Asia will be discussed more fully below, 
some immediate react-ion might be useful at this point. 
The Peking: Review, published under the title ItJapanese 
Militarism Back in the Saddle," a copy from a Japanese 
-"white paper" concerning the growth of Japanese military 
spending. The figures on page 71 disclose not only a 
steady pattern of growth in spending throughout the entire 
period, but also that, since 1969 (the year of the Nixon 
doctrine), the pattern of growth spending was broken by 
sharp ncreases. 
I The New York Times, April 28, 1971, p. 7. 






JAPAN'S ANNUAL DEFENSE SPENDING: 
1950-197124 













































Given at the old rate of 360 yen = one dollar. 
Generally, the past policy of China in dealing with 
the question of Japanese militarism has been an attempt 
to force a split between that country and the U.S. '):10­
day, this policy by qhina may have been reversed in view 
of the danger that such a split could necessitate an in­
crease in defense spending by Japan. In fact, fear of 
Japan may well have been one of the motives for Pekingts 
,recent moves to\vard "detente" with the United States. 
AlthQug~ the Japanese military budget in proportional terms 
241JiJ'g,panes,e Militarism Back in the Saddle, tf 
Peking Review, No.5, January 29, 1971, pp. 20-21. 
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is the smallest of the major po'\vers (less than 1 percent 
of the total Japanese Gro~s National Product), the 
Japanese economy already dominates areas of great sensi­
tivity to China (especially'Tai.wan and South Korea). 
China's attacks on Japan I s late'S't policies are impor­
tant for several reasons, which i'nclude among them the 
need for a neutralization of a potentially hostile 
Japan, especially if faced with a realization in the 
Russian threat. In addition, "Peking views, regarding 
Taiwan, Japan's trade and investment in the island and 
the historic orientation of the Taiwanese toward Japan 
as the chief stimulants to continued separatism there." 25 
The future question to be answered by the Chinese 
leadership while simultaneously remembering the 
Japanese role in the inter-war period, is whether or 
not Japan is prepared today to defend its economic 
26empire in Asia through military means. 
Both China and the Soviet union have referred to 
the reversion of Okinawa as the "Okina'\vinization offR 
Japan~~12t:fther words, both Russia and China see 
~w~>~· ~... Reischauer, "Fateful Triangle-- The 
United ~~es, Japan and China," The New York Times, 
Section IV, September 19, 1971, p:-I3-.-- --- ­
26 Ibid • 
27For example, see The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 23, July 6, 1971, p. 16.--­
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the acquisition by Japan of Okinawa and its huge mili­
tary bases as a significant step by that country towards 
total remilitarization. As early as December 16, 1969, 
Pravda was writting in reference to the Nixon-Sato 
Guam meeting that up to then, the post-war expansion of 
Japanese militarism in Asia had been 1argely economic 
in nature. The talks between Nixon and Sato indicated 
IIthat Japan's ruling circles are now ready to reinforce 
economic penetration by political means and; if neces­
sary, by military means as well.,,28 In June of 1969, 
another Soviet writer had also indicated fears over the 
growing military, since, 
Japanese monopolies are actively working 
to strengthen ASPAC economically and mili­
tarily ••• Now Japan's military circles 
are giving strong support to plans to set 
up a Pacific military alliance-- PATO • 
.aWashingtQn wants (the article claimed). 
l··wi:l:11-J'·a:p:a:n1 said, to turn PATO into a 
'superbloc' s~earheaded against the 
USSR.29 
A more recent article in Izvestia entitled: "Arm, 
Arm, and Arm some More," published in April of 1971, 
28Ibid., Vol. XXI, No. 50, January 13, 1970, 
p. 3. 
29 I • Sergienko, "Japanese lviilitarism Raises 
Its Head," International Affairs (June 1969), p. 33. 
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asked in reference to the drafted new military build­
up plan: 
Why does Japan need a strong army? The 
authors of the draft explain that it will 
be charged with the task of participating 
in 'limited local wars.' What they mean 
by those words can only be guessed. But 
it is perfectly obvious that the NDA 
(National Defense Agency) is beginning 
to ready a military machine for actions30
that can in no way be called defensive. 
Another article published in Moscow was entitled: 
"The Tokyo Trial: A Reminder." It issued a warning 
which could hardly be mistaken in Tokyo. After noting 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tokyo Trial (i.e., 
from May 3,1946 to November 12, 1946), the article 
saw, 
the same tendencies endangering peace, 
which ultimately brought the major war 
criminals into the dock in 1946 • • • 
once again appearing and developing in 31 
the country where these men were tried. 
If continued, Japanese rearmament would "acquire a 
dangerous significance." In particular, 
the extensive rearm,ament programme is 
designed to boost the expansion of 
Japanese monopolies in Southeast Asia. 
That was revealed last autumn (1970) •• 
30"Arm, Arm, and Arm Some More," The Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII,~. 17, May 25, 
1971, p. 39. (See also Izvestia, April 30, 1971, p .. 2.) 
~ls. Budkevich and M. Rahinsky, "The Tokyo Trial: 
A Reminder," International Affairs, (August 1971), p. 74. 
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by Nakasone, chief of the National Defense 
Agency who said: "Japan will actively in­
vest her capital i~ southeast Asia and own 
sizeable assets i:l..I. 'this area. This will 
give rise to rights and interests and a 
vital frontier. In order to defend them, 
Japan will eventually require military 
strength! '32 , 
The article also claimed that: . 
there are many men among the ruling circles 
of present-day Japan who refuse to reckon with 
the experience of history and its lessons, 
and who have taken a policy of revenge as a 
guide to action.33 . 
Finally, for, 
those who seek to reverse the tide' of 
history, those who ignore the lessons 
of history and take the way traveled by 
Toio,- Hagaki, and their like, the 
Tokyo Trial and the judgment 'of the 
International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East is a grim warning. 34 
What in 'effect is usually meant by the term 
"complete remilitarization" is usually meant both the 
conventional, as well as nuclear rearming of Japan. 
By 1972, Japan had accumulated some experience and a 
sizeable mass of data on ~leapon,s technology in nuclear 
systems building and associated delivery systems. Japan 
has, through 1972, kept open its options on building a 
32Ibid • 
33Ibid • , p. 76. 
34Ibid • , p. 107. 
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nuclear stockpile and could in no less than six months 
from the time of the political decision have a sizea­
ble arsenal. 35 
The realization of the political decision to begin 
building a nuclear arsenal could be brought about given 
the proper stimuli. For example: 
If the big powers continue to use nuclear 
capability as the yardstick of strength, 
Japan one day may feel compelled to go 
nuclear. This sobering note of warning 
was struck recently by Kiichi Miyazawa, 
former Minister of International Trade and 
Indu~~ry and one of Japan's elder states­
men. 
The official government position was expressed by 
Foreign Minister Fukuda who said that Japan has a 
"nuclear allergy." He also stated that he felt Japan, 
should not have nuclear arms or any sub­
stantial military means. Being an eco­
nomic power, but declining to be a mili­
tary power, we have a certain reserve of 
power. We c~n use it for the development 37 
of the less advanced part of the world. • • 
One reason Japan fears becoming a nuclear military 
power is directly linked to its geographic liabilities. 
35The New York Times, December 26, 1971, p. 22. 
36Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18, 1971, 
p. 21. 
37"Who Will Succeed Sato in Japan? Interviews with 




The vast majority of Japan's population and industry 
are concentrated into a small area and are an easy tar­
get for nuclear attack. Japan is also a difficult 
country to defend since, unlike the United States, China, 
or the Soviet Union, its total area is small, and with 
few relatively unoccupied areas, it would not take 
many hydrogen bombs to completely saturate all three 
main islands. Keepinq this in mind, neither can one 
forget that the only atomic weapons ever actually used 
in warfare were dropped on Japan. This factor has left 
the Governments and people of Japan psychologically 
squeamish in any association to anything "nuclear." 
In this sense, the policy in Japan from 1945 to 1972 
has been an aversion to the nuclear question, and even 
undue caution when dealing in diplomacy with the 
nuclear powers. The policy of Prime Minister Sato has 
been to keep Japan's involvement in international 
issues at a minimum, thereby hoping to keep Japan away 
as far as possible from active involvement in any general 
war. It was the "post-war nuclear fear" that pressed 
Japan to extract from President Nixon a promise to re­
move all nuclear weapons from Okinawa prior to reversion. 
In·addition, it has been also the past policy of Japan 
to keep open at least economic ties with the Cormnunist 
countries. This was in part desiqned to avoid too close 
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an association and involvement with the foreign policies 
of anyone nuclear power. 
If "nuclear aversion" has been linked to the 
post-war period in Japan, and, as Prime Minister Sato 
and others have said, the revers.i-on of Okinawa in :r.1ay of 
1972 ended the post-war era for' Japan; does that mean 
that the nuclear aversion has ended also? Recent indica­
tions of Japanese public opinion may in fact be follO'~v-
ing the pattern previously set regarding the acquision 
of conventional arms. In other words, the old antipathy 
to IInuclearization" may have ended as Japan enters its 
new role in Asia. t-lost people in Japan today now be­
lieve the country will go nuclear over the next de­
cade. 38 
Today. in the view of many government of­
ficials and industrialists who keep their 
"fingers on the public pulse here, the emo­
tional antipathy of the Japanese to things 
nuclear has all but vanished. . . While 
emotional and political opposition to 
things nuclear is dying, Japanese techni­
cal skills in the nuclear field are rapid­
ly increasing, includ~~g the capacity to 
make nuclear weapons. 
Today, about one-third of the population in Japan 
38nl-lissing Superpower, n Economist, July 31, 1971, 
p. 14. 
39The New York Times, December 26, 1971. p. 22. 
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feels nuclear weapons for the country acceptable if not 
desirable. 40 
As previously indicated; a variety of Western 
values and incentives were "grafted" on Japan. These 
graftings included democratic pX';Ln.cipals as well as a 
general demilitarization. The iatter declared the 
Japanese people to forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation. However, these stipulations pre­
sumed at least two conditions: first, that the policy 
implemented from above by the American Supreme Comman­
der would actually take hold; and second, that Japan 
would henceforth and indefinitely be protected by 
American military power. Democracy and demilitarization 
were designed to be instilled in the Japanese by two 
means: by law and by attitude. If the attitudes of the 
Japanese people towards militarization and nucleariza­
tion are changing, is it possible that the simultaneou­
sly instilled attitudes towards democracy, are concomi­
tantly changing? 
It was Article IX in the 1947 Constitution of Japan 
that renounced the right for the country to ever main­
tain air, sea or land forces or other war potential. This 
so-called "pacifist clause" was, however, rendered 
40 Ibid • 
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ineffective long ago with the development of the 
"Self-Defense Forces." A second guard against rever­
sion to the old pre-war path of militarism was to be 
found in Article 96, designed to make constitutional 
revision difficult. It requires "on the part of those 
favoring it not only the necessary support in the Diet 
but also real confidence that public opinion is on their 
side."4l Yet, in the end, legal considerations may be of 
little significance, although many people in Japan consi­
der them a safeguard against nuclearization. This is 
because, .. contrary to widespread opinion I ,there is 
nothing in the Japanese Constitution that specifically 
prohibits nuclear weaporis."42 The only viable defense 
of democracy and demilitarization lie outside of the 
constitutions and codes, and within the attitudes of the 
people. If the people of Japan have not yet acquired an 
attitude for the values of democracy and peace, no paper 
constitution will be able to secure it for them. 
The real arguments against nuclearization for Japan 
today stem from practical considerations. The advocates 
41R. Storry, "Options for Japan in the 1970's," 
World Today. (August 1970), p. 325. 
42The New York Times, December 26. 1971, p. 22. 
See a1soK:" Hirasawi, "Japan's Future World Role and 




against nuclearization cite such considerations as: 
Japan's vulnerable position to nuclear attack with 90 
percent of the population situated on a 100-mile belt; 
Japan cannot hope to catch up with u.s. and Soviet 
missae technoloqy and could never really expect to ac­
quire a "second-strike" capacity; and, Japan, as a nuclear 
power, would probably friqhten the other Asian nations, 
in turn having a negative affect on business. Never­
theless, as noted, indications are increasing that with 
the u.S. withdrawal, the nuclear threat from China, and 
the desire of many Japanese to gain Superpower status, 
Japan may in fact be "forced" to acquire nuclear capa­
city. Popular magazines in Japan today carry articles 
giving the pro and cons on the nuclear question, anti ­
nuclear demonstrations find fewer participants each 
year, and with the younger generation having no direct 
memory of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, nuclear science is 
attracting increasing numbers of young students. 43 In 
addition to the building of nuclear power plants de­
signed to help safisfy Japan's peaceful fuel needs, the 
country is expected to complete late in 1972 its first 
nuclear ship (the fourth non-warship of its kind in the 
worldJ. 
43
The New York Times, December 26, 1971, p. 22. 
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Finally, there still exists the larqer question of 
democracy itself as a viabl~ ~nstitution in a peaceful 
Japan. One observer has suggested that there is, 
widespread criticism'of the Constitution 
as 'an alien and impra~,tical' document, 
and strong demands, espeCially among 
leading members of the LDP, for official 
recognition of the Emperor as the Head of 
State, with the Cabinet directly responsi­
ble to him or, more correctly, to the powers 
behind the throne, as during the Meiji 
oligarchy. Indeed. the Meiji Constitution 
is being cited as the model for future 
constitutional amendments. 44 
This, in fact, may be the future case for Japan. 
In October of 1971, it was reported that the 
ruling LDP is moving towards a proposal for a,thorough 
revision of the present Constitution. 
Osamu Inaba, chairman of the party committee 
drafting the revision, said the major 
changes would be proposed in the famous 'no 
war' article, in controls over military 
forces, the political position of the 
Emperor, and perhaps in the structure 
of the Diet, or Parliament. 45 
The change in the Emperor's position would be from the 
present status as nthe symbol of the state and the unity 
of the people,n to renaming him as the head of state. 
The party chairman also noted: 
44Rhee, pp. 395-396. 
45 The New York Times, October 30, 1971, p. 11. 
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the Emperor as head of state in the 
Constitution would reflect a resurgence 
of national pride and confidence among 
the Japanese and would be another return 
to traditional concepts as the Japanese 
seek their national identity.46 
Thus, the fear of the political and military return by 
Japan to the pre-war structure appear~ a valid one. 
Japan's democratic foundation is ex­
tremely shallow despite its successful 
facade and there is still a wide popular 
belief that affairs of state should be 
managed by 'those \'Jho know best. ' 4'7 
other observers disagree, suggesting that if Japanese 
nationalism revives it probably.will not be centered 
around the monarchy, but will, rather, center around the 
Japanese race. 48 
46Ibid • 

47Rhee, p. 397. 









Following the defeat of ~ap~n in 1945, the 
American occupation forces attempted to transform the 
country's basic attitudes by laying a base from which 
a democratic and peaceful society could be built. 
Specifically, the transformation of Japanese society 
saw the ultimate objectives of peace and democracy 
to be a"chieved by: (1) applying the democratic con­
cept in education; (2) encouraging a wide distribution 
of income and ownership throughout the population in 
the means of production and trade; (3) the elimination 
from office and punishment of those persons associated 
closely with Japan's militaristic policies at home 
and abroad; (4) limiting Japan's sovereignty to only 
the immediate home islands; and, (5) the destruction 
of the "military establishment and its economic base. 
Since under these conditions Japan would not be 
able to defend itself, on September 8" 1951, the United 
States signed the Treaty of Peace and Mutual Security, 
guaranteeing its security. Although both Article IX 
(i. e., the "no-'YTar claus'e") of the Japanese Constitution 
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and the Security Treaty pledged Japan to live peace­
fully with other nations and to settle disputes only by 
amic-sle means, the treaty was modified to read that 
Japan was not to be deprived of "the right of indivi­
dual and collective self-defense." At the same time, 
the Security Treaty with the United States (as with 
similar treaties involving Australia, New Zealand and 
the Philippines) did not obligate Japan to assist in 
the defense of that country should any of its territory 
or armed forces be attacked. In addition to being re­
newed in 1960, the Security Treaty was also revised in 
that the United States would n~l consult with Japan 
before using its bases for war or before introducing 
nuclear weapons. In November of 1969 the Security 
Treaty was transformed into the Treaty of Mutual Co­
operation and Security. In a joint message by 
President Nixon and Prime Ninister Sato, the new 
security treaty was to be continued indefinitely be­
yond its June 1970 expiration date. It was also al­
tered to read that either party could now terminate 
the treaty whenever so desired. 
The meeting in 1969 between President Nixon and 
Prime Hinister Sato also produced other results. The 
most important of these included an agreement for the 
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1972 reversion of Okinawa, and raised Sato's domestic 
popularity to an all-time high. Sato was so exuberated 
with this triumph he declared in a speech that, hence­
forth, it would be considered that the "security of 
(, ' 
the Republic of Korea \vas essen't'ial to Japan's secur­
ity," and, in addition, that the lttsecurity of Taiwan 
was also a most important factor in the security of 
Japan.'~ 
Since Sato's 1969 speech tying together Japanese 
security to the security of Tai\van and South Korea, 
world conditions and conditions in Japan have drasti ­
cally altered. Until 1969 the conservative Governments 
of Japan had centered their foreign policies on close 
political, economic, and military ties with the United 
States. ~They saw the Soviet Union as the principal 
threat to their security and believed that economic 
growth depended on successfully countering thi~ threat~~ 
In addition, before and through 1969, the united States 
had acted as a tremendous supplier of raw materials to 
Japan and as a huge market for Japanese exports. In 
Isee The New York Times, November 22, 1969, p. 14, 
for complete text. - ­
2w'e1nst'e1n, p. 195 • 
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military terms, ~erican air, sea and land forces 
largely protected Japan's access to the resources and 
markets of the non-Communist world. 
On the economic level, the supremacy of the 
United States has been lost since 1969. The American 
economy no longer controls the once numerous export 
markets, no longer unquestionably controls such vast 
accumulations of raw materials, and no longer can 
out-compete other countries nearly at will. On the 
political level, both the "detente" with China and the 
less than careful manner in which it was carried out, 
have, when combined, pushed Japan and the united States 
apart, with both casting aside the old beneficial roles 
that each had played. 
The fact that Japan has gradually in the past 
20 years outgrown the old relationship which had cast 
I 
the country as a junior American partner, could probably 
not have been avoided by any American administration. 
The problems of American-Japanese relations go far be­
3yond those enumerated in this paper. Many of these 
problems find their source deep in the over-commitments 
30ne could even liken Japan's investing role in 
vietnam and the economic benefits which were derived, 
to the similar role the United States played as a 
supplier to the Allies in World War I. 
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4of the American role in Vietnam. 
Specifically. the fouF "shocks" which might have 
been blunted in intensity through more careful advance 
preparation and more gentle application, were: (l) the 
I" 
sudden and last minute announcement of Nixon's Peking 
trip; (2) the severe economic measures (the suspension 
of dollar conversion and a 10 percent surcharge openly 
aimed at Japan), and yen revaluation; (3) the imposi­
tion of textile quotas; and, (4) the success of getting 
Japan to co-sponsor the United Nation motion allowing 
Taiwan to keep its membership, which then dramatically 
failed. In the face of this, stability in the Asian 
region may nevertheless be'inconceivable without a 
continuing. close, cooperative relationship between 
Japan and the United States.~ 
In a statement by President Nixon made in Bangkok, 
Thailand, on July 28, 1969, the Nixon doctrine was ex­
"piili!ned for its Asian implications: 
What we seek for Asia is a community of 
"free nations able to go their own way and 
'} 
,I 
~Neither does this paper find itself in dispute 
with those world-wide international issues and policies 
conductea by the United'States from 1968 through 1972, 
extending far beyond the immediate scope of this paper. 
5Hirasawa, p. 338. 
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seek their own destiny with whatever 
cooperation vie can provide-- a com­
Munity of independent Asian countries, 
developing through mutual cooperation. 6 
The President further added: 
our cooperation with Japan will be 
crucial to our efforts to help other 
Asian nations develop in peace. 
Japan's partnership with us will be 
a key to the success of the Nixon 
Doctrine in Asia. 7 
The Nixon doctrine as originally enumerated on Guam, 
draws a distinction between those countries which are 
J 
not industrialized and where American defense commit­
ments must be limited, and those countries which are 
industrialized like Japan, Australia, and Western 
Europe where commitments are greater. 
If Japan's partnership with the United States is 
the "key to the· success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia," 
and the President's methods in arriving at a lidet~~e" 
with China went far to destroy that very partnership, 
how was such a policy to be explained? The attempt was 
made by President Nixon in a statement to the Congress 
on February 9, 1972: 
For our part, we have made it clear that 
our aim in Peking is to establish a 
6Nixon, "Statement by the President •• • ," p. 53. 
7Ibid ." p. 58. 
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better mutual understanding of one an­
other's policies. We will not seek or 
discuss bilateral arrangements that 
could adversely affect the interests 
of our allies. We have no interest 
in arrangements which would sacrifice 
our friendship with a lonq-standing 
ally to the need for better communica­
tion with a long-standing adversary.8 
More specifically, Nixon apologized that we: 
were able to inform our friends only 
shortly before this announcement, and 
we understand the complications this 
caused for them. There were overriding 
reasons for keeping Dr. Kissinger's 
July visit secret. We could not risk 
advance public disclosure of these con­
versations whose outcome we could not 
predict • . • Reqardless of how it was 
achieved, the change in the U.S.-Chinese 
relationship after 20 years of animosity 
was bound to be unsettling • • • The 
price we paid for secrecy was therefore 
unavoidable. It should prove transitory.9 
These statements create more questions than 
they. answer. Was Prime Minister Sato of Japan not ex­
pected to be able to keep such an important secret? 
Surely Sato, following his removal from the post of 
Prime Minister would not find the "unsettling" change as 
"transitory." Finally, a price could in fact be ex­
pected to be paid in Japanese-American relations, but 
the vital question to be answered is whether the 
., IIaN'l.xon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's •• 
p. 341. 
9Ibid •• p. 329. 
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improvement in Chinese relations was worth the price 
paid by America or whether it came too high. 
Following the Nixon visit to China, Marshall 
~reen, the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs, was sent to the region in an. effort to 
bolster sagging spirits and reassure doubting allies. 
with his return to the United States he appeared before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and reported 
that he, 
detected considerable concern, not about 
our government's intention to provide 
adequate assistance under the Nixon doc­
trine, but rather about its ability to 
do so in the face of what appears to them 
a growing anti-aid attitude in the united 
States. There is indeed much concern 
lest our programs of support for Asian 
nations decline too rapidly. They are 
watching closelY to see exactly what we 
mean when we say that we stand by our 
commitments and that we intend to remain 
a Pacific power. lO 
Several days later the Assistant Secretary again 
publically appeared, this time on the television show, 
"Meet the Press. II In reply to a question, Assistant 
Secretary Green enumerated another fear that had arisen 
lOMarshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs,"Security Assistance for 
East Asia and the Long-Range U.S. Interests. Made 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 
23, 1972,," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, 
No. 1712, April 17, 1972, ~ 579. 
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from the conduct of recent American actions in Asia: 
The question of whether there were any 
secret deals, for example, 'Vlnether there 
were any kinds of negotiations behind 
their back; and I think I vIas able to 
prove convincingly that there was not. ll 
Neither the premise of no secret deals having been made, 
nor the conclusion that all were convinced by the 
Assistant Secretary, has yet been proven. Today in 
Japan and in Asia those very two fears remain. 
Perhaps the primary example in the reduction of 
American Pacific power outside of Vietnam itself, is 
the retired position of the United States in Okinawa. 
Actually, Okinawa represents only the last of several 
territories returned by America since the war. The 
Amami Islands lying south of Kyushu, were returned to 
Japan in Decem~er of 1954. In June of 1968, the Bonin 
Islands, which includes Iow-Jima, were returned. 
Okinawa was returned'in 1972 and became Japan's 47th 
Prefecture. 
The United States still has, as of 1972, 101 
military installations in Japan, 80 of them in 
Okinawa. More importantly, Okinawa serves as the 
nerve center for united States defense in the Pacific. 
By reverting the military complex back to the 
II" . . dAss~stant Secretary Green Interv~ewe on t-1eet 
the Press, II ibid., p. 572. 
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administrative control of Japan, the u.s. is now limited 
to "prior approval" from th,at. country before the im­
plementation of any American military initiative. The 
reversion of American "military sovereignty" in Okinawa 
means the u.s. must now consult, with Japan before in­
creasing military strength on any'of its "Japanese" 
bases, before making any majorequipment changes, or be­
fore directing combat military operations from those 
bases. Reversion also adds Okinawa to the list of 
Asian countries in which the u.s. may not store nuclear 
weapons. Moreover, since Taiwan is also "nuclear free," 
the u.s. must now depend on South Korea and the 
Fhilippines, in addition to several other minor South 
East Asian areas, for nuclear deployment. 
The concession of military sovereignty by the 
United States in the reversion of Ok,inawa was a,lso de­
signed to provide positive results. By ending American 
occupation of former Japanese territory, America was 
making good on its pledge of no territorial gains from 
World War II. In addition, by reverting Okinawa, it was 
hoped that a source of tension would be eliminated, in 
addition to also establishing diplomatic equality be­
tween the United States and Japan. However, Japan can' 
never be truly equal to the u.s. as long as any American 
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military bases exist anywhere on Japanese territory. 
Moreover, it appears that the reversion of Okinawan 
administration to Japan may actually increase tensions, 
since the purpose of Okinawa for the u.s. is obviously 
military, while any American military operations from 
"Japanese soil" simultaneously "implicate" Japan, and 
are therefore resented. 
Okinawa if not handled careful by both sides could 
turn into an easily exploitable'political issue. Indi­
cations are that Japan vlill seek in the future an even 
closer control over American military movement to, from, 
and within the country.12 This action would go far to 
impair American military effectiveness in Asia and 
could produce a conflict of interest, as long as America 
has important interests in Asia. 
Some earlier problems over the new status of 
Okinawa have already arisen. For example, B-52 bombers 
might be permanently banned from use in Okinawa, thereby 
forcing the u.s. to rely on' either Guam or Thailand. 
The question of how long Thailand will remain secure to 
American forces is an interesting one, while Guam is 
hundreds of extra miles from both Southeast Asia and 
l2The Japan Times, April 26, 1971. p. 1. 
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South Korea. Although Guam is an American territory, 
the other islands are held under a United Nations 
trusteeship with their future unresolved. 
Problems over American-Japanese co-rule had 
appeared even before Okinawa had been returned. While 
the Japanese Communist Party opposed the conditions of 
the agreement returning Okinawa, the Japanese Socialist 
Party claimed that the reversion of Okinawa "at the 
hands of the Sato Cabinet and the U.S. Government is 
deceptive because it tramples underfoot the Okinawans' 
wish for an unconditional reversion. n13 Without un­
conditional reversion, the complaint went, there was a 
chance that Japan might be drawn into a war. The 
Komeito did express some support for the American return 
of the islands, but added that "the strong desire for 
the elimination of everything that might lead to war and 
for guaranteed basic rights for the Okinawans,,14 were 
not fully satisfied. The Democratic Socialist Party 
followed the same policy line as the others, criticizing 
the U.S. base riqhts in Okinawa. 
All the Diet members from both the Japan Socialist 
Party and the Japan Communist Party, as well as the 





seven Dietmen elected from Okinawa, boycotted the 
government-sponsored ceremonies celebrating reversion. 
The other two parties attended the ceremonies, but 
added that they would probably join any new campaign 
designed to "improve" the terms of the Okinawan 
agreement. IS 
Within days following the American return of the 
islands, problems were already building over what 
degree Japanese authorities would allow the United 
States to use its bases on the island. The government 
expressed fear that it might be "drawn into" the war 
in Vietnam, since the U.s. continued to use its bases 
at several locations in Japan to: (1) conduct a mid­
air refueling of Vietnam-bound B-S2's by planes based 
on Okinawa; (2) transfer F-4 Phantom jets from Iwakuni 
Air Base to Vietnam; (3) sail U.s. naval ships then in 
port from Yokosuka to the South China Sea; and, (4) 
bring tanks from Vietnam to American bases for the 
purpose of conducting repairs. 16 In reply to the 
Japanese fear, a: 
U.S. State Department official said that 
the U.S. would expect an affirmative reply 
l5 Ibid., May 14, 1972, p. 2. 

16The New York Times, April 2S, 1972, p. 9. 
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from Japan to a request for permission 
to use u.s. military bases in Japan, 
including those in Okinawa, for combat 
operations.!7 
Although President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato 
exchanged friendly greetings during the Okinawan re­
version ceremonies using the newly installed "hot line" 
between the countries for the first time, the real 
significance in policy direction for the United States 
following reversion was that it represented a very signi­
ficant step in the dismantling of the American contain­
ment of China. Since Okinawa lies close off the China 
coast, any increased responsibilities for Japan within 
the confines of the important military base could hardly 
serve to better Japan-China relations. Not only was the 
reversion important in American foreign policy, but fol­
lowing its celebration, China reduced its quanity and 
strength of criticism directed against the Japanese­
U.S. Security Treaty.lS The leadership of China realize 
that they have as much to lose from the remilitariza­
tion of Japan as anyone in Asia. 
In 1972 American-Japanese relations were at their 
lowest point since the end of the war. Part of the pro­
blem is personal with the Nixon Administration. There: 
l7The Japan Times, March 17, 1971, p. 1. 
18I bid., r4ay 19, 1972, p. 1. 
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is a distinct op1n1on existing in Japan 
that Dr. Kissinger is 'anti-Japanese/' 
that he does not know Asia and makes 
light of it. Kissinger is seen as a 
'Machiavellian type' who is distrusted 
by many Japanese based on his role in 
Nixon's Asian policies. 19 
A second major complaint was that although Kissinger had 
had time to go to Peking to arrange through secret talks 
with Chinese leaders for Nixon's visit, he seemed to 
have no time to visit America's most important ally in 
Asia. From April 20 through April 24 of 1972, Kissinger 
was in Moscow (after having cancelled a trip to Japan 
over the vietnam question), for secret talks with Soviet 
leaders on the upcoming Nixon Sununit conference. Dr. 
Kissinger did not finally arrive in Japan until mid-June, 
after a second postponment in May over the Moscow trip. 
lvloreover, the Kissinger delays to Japan were seen as: 
another instance of the United States' 
growing indifterence to its Asian ally . • • 
The conclusion here is that the White 
House has shifted the terms of the 
Japanese alliance to its own advantage 
and invited Japan to take it or leave 
it. 'I think Mr. Kissinger sees us as 
a childish and emotional country, and 
he is proceeding on that basis,' a 
senior Foreign Ministry official said••• 20 
In addition, the Japanese see Kissinger as the embodiment 
of the anti-Japanese mood~ insensitive to modern Japan 
19The Japan Times Weekly, April 22, 1972, p. 3. 
20The New York Times, April 15, 1972, p. 9. 
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"and willing to cast Japan as a rival instead of an 
.. 21ally 
Other problems have been raised by other prominent 
Americans and their statements of attitude. For exam­
pIe, a row was touched off by the remarks of Defense 
Secretary Helvin Laird when they were interpeted in 
Japan as advocating the acquision by that country of 
nuclear weapons. The Defense Secretary, after noting 
that the U.S., now provides Japan's nuclear shield, 
added that: 
I believe in that area of the world they 
have a greater responsibility • • • I be­
lieve that they should be bearing a greater 
responsibility for the economic as well as 
the military burden of defending peace and 
maintainin~ the security of that area of 
the world. 2 
President Nixon's personal embarrassment of Sato 
on a one-to-one basis, however, was probably in an immed­
iate sense, the most damaging. 
In Washington, President Nixon's unilateral 
moves on China, the yen, 'and textiles last 
year are seen to reflect hostility against 
Premeir Eisaku Sato, who reneged on his 
1969 promise to curb textile exports after 
Nixon pledged Okinawa's return. But to the 
Japanese, it was not their 'lameduck' 
premier, but Japan that was ignored. The 
2lIbid • 

2,2The Japan Times, l-1ay 21, 1972, p. 4. 
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Nixon 'shocks' are regarded as a national 
humiliation. 23 
When Prime Minister Sato was asked for his response 
as he sat watching a worldwide broadcast over tele­
vision of the Nixon visit to Peking, he replied "dis­
dainfully" that "President Nixon himself claims it's 
an epoch-making event. II Then, lIin a voice iced with 
sarcasm he added: 'If he says so, how can we dispute 
it?,"24 
The response to Nixon's China-shock among the 
leading candidates seeking to replace Sato in July 
of 1972 was quite uniform. Sato's own choice, Foreign 
Minister Takeo Fukuda. replied that as: 
far as President Nixon's visit to China 
is concerned, I certainly welcome it. 
But the way it was done, in the sudden, 
abrupt ~anner-- is not something I 
really appreciate . • • it should never 
be repeated. 25 
,
A second major contender and the man who replaced Sato 
as Prime Minister was Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Inter­
national Trade and Industry. He observed that the: 
Japanese are a very cautious people. The 
kind of move Mr. Nixon made to Red China 
without reference to Japan-- this is not 
23The Harold International Tribune, April 26, 
1972, p."47 
24Newsweek. ~1arch 6, 1972. p. 4. 
25Ibid., May 15, 1972, pp. 44-45. 
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the way we would have done it. We 
would have given you advance notice. 
Courtesy is something. Orientals 
respect. 26 ' 
A third contender for the pqst was former Foreign 
Minister l-1asayoshi Ohira, who f€-9t'rectly noted that in: 
the international sphere, .changes are in 
order. From now on, Japan will not be able 
to depend too much on the U.S., and I be­
lieve the u.s. desires Japan to be more 
self-supporting .•• The U.S. does not 
have the power anymore to limitlessly 
assist various countries around the globe 
with its goodwill. We have developed our 
national power and the U. S·. wants to reduce 
her over-commitment. These two factors 
will work as an impetus to change the 
U.S.-Japanese relationship.27 
A fourth high-ranking Japanese official call~d 
President Nixon's China-shock a Pearl Harbor in re­
verse. He added t.hat the abrupt "announcement set 
back Japanese-American relations by ten years. u28 
In part, the American initiative with China can 
be seen as a negative reaction to the economic threat 
from Japan. The Japanese government has estimated that 
by 1980, Sino-Japanese trade could reach $3,200 million.-i:tJ 
What Japan fears is that an American entry into the China 
market, especially into the areas of machine tools, 
26 Ibid • 
27 Ibid • 
28The New York Times, August 4, 1971, p. 1. 
'2,9 
Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 4. 
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aircraft and generators, Will threaten their position. 
Some Japanese expect Sino-~erican trade within three 
years to reach $200 million. 





having been forced into the Ame'rican picture of con­
taining China throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the 
United States had now blithely turned its back, leaving 
Japan alone, in a precarious position to find its own 
solutions to the Cold War riddle. Politically and 
psycho1ogica11y:J 
American-Japanese ties are more important 
to the Japanese than to the Americans, and 
this the Japanese sense and resenti eco­
nomically, the relationship now favors 
the Japanese, and this the Americans in­
creasingly begrudge.~ 
Therefore, while the United States has attempted 
to force through an economic readjustment between the 
two countries, the Japanese have been moving to redress 
the political, psychological and military imbalance. 
The net affect upon Japan has, in some ways, been 
highly bene·ficia1.. While the American initiative towards 
China has left a brightly lit path for Japan to follow, 
the Soviet Union has also become less intractable to 
Tokyo. While relations between China and Japan may soon 
30Brzezinski, p. 270. 
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be normalized, relations between Japan and the Soviet 
Union may soon see a signing of a peace treaty and 
other mutually beneficial actions. 
In addition, the ne~v independent policy has ob­
~', ' " . 
tained for Japan other dip10mat.ic ~bjectives. On 
February 19, 1972, Japan and the ?.1ongo1ian People IS 
Republic announced the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. This \vas the first time that Japan had es­
tab1ished diplomatic relations \'lith a Communist country 
in Asia.. Tokyo has also since the Nixon ushocks," 
been una'fraid to open contacts with both North Vietnam 
and North Korea. As in the case of a Japanese de1e­
gation to Hanoi and without informing Washington before­
hand, the Sato- adm::.nistration in February and March of 
1972 began moving towards the recognition of Bangladesh, 
a country to which up to that time the u.S. had, totally 
ignored. At the conclusion of the Sapporo Olympics, the 
head of the North Korean delegation stayed on in Japan 
to host a series of lavish receptions to honor the newly 
formed Korea-Japan Export and Import Corporation. Simu1­
taneous1y, Socialist Governor Ryokichi Minobe invited a 
group of ranking North Koreans to pay an unprecedented 
visit to Tokyo. 
These actions are ~, obvious indication that 
Japan nOv1 fee ls the u. s. is probably no longer totally 
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reliable. Shocked at being excluded in a major policy 

alteration which drastically affected Japan itself, the 

Japanese now fear being played off against China. 

The Nixon initiative toward Peking vio­
lated the spirit, if not the letter, of 
the principle of joint consultation, and 
it is quite likely that in the future it 
will be more difficult for the" two capi­
tals to concert their policies. 31 
_~eonelusie:A, Nixon's policies tovvards China will be, 
in the long run, qood for the American interest even if 
it only allows the united States to escape its own con­
tainment policy which rigid anti-Communism demanded. The 
United States has now found new flexibility in foreign 
policy which previously it had denied itself. In part, 
this new flexible position was born of necessity, since 
the United States in the 1970's finds it no longer has 
quite the ability to pressure others into a partnership 
of its own will. 
31Ibid., p. 272. 
CHAPTER VI 
JAPAN I S ROLE IN ASIA 
To an important degree Japan fears too close an 
association with the United States in the post-Sato 
world. The Japanese fear being linked to the American 
war effort in Vietnam, which it is felt, could taint 
Japan's future role as the re-builder of Asia. The 
Japanese already suffer from a somewhat tarnished image 
in Asia. Resentment and envy has come from Japan's 
ruthless investment practices, from the attitudes and 
practices of Japanese businessmen abroad, from its un­
fair trading methods, from its often smug or superior 
attitude towards other Asian trading nations, from its 
refusals to liberalize controls on imports of foreign 
capital and goods, an~ most of all, from its very success 
in economics. l 
Equally important to Japan is its lingering image 
from the Second World War. The animosity that Japan had 
built in this earlier period lingers on not only in Asia 
but also in Europe and throughout the world. Even in 
Okinawa (a part of Japan itself prior to and during the 
1 ...Far Eastern Econom~c Rev~ew, Apr~l 8, 1972, p. 21. 
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war), animosity and fear exist'. Only one week before 
reversion another atrocity had been reported by the 
Okinawan media in which Japanese military forces had 
apparently killed Okinawan civilians in the closing 
stages of the war. Other world-wide events, such as the 
Lod Airport suicide attack in Israel by Japanese ex­
2 ' 
tremists in May of 1972, resulting in 26 deaths, have 
served to keep memories of the extreme devotion once held 
by the Japanese to old causes, still alive. 
In addition to certain other signs of independence 
recently displayed, Japan has moved to assume part of 
the "leadership" void in IIfree li Asia, left by the American 
withdrawal. An example of this came on February 17, 
1972, when the Japanese government offered Tokyo as a 
site for a possible summit meeting between the Pakistani 
President, Zu1fikar Ali Butto, and the Bang1adish Prime 
Minister, Shekh Mujikur Rahman. In late February of 
1972, in another example of "leadership initiative" and 
its drawing avlay from dependency on the United States, 
Japan signed with France an agreement calling for joint 
nuclear research and development. 
2 
Following the Lod Airport terrorist attack in 
Israel, Japanese businessmen and tourists had to be 'evacu­
ated from Puerto Rico to the u.s. mainland. Officials 
feared retaliation for the 14 Puerto Ricans killed at the 
Lod Airport by the three Japanese terrorists. See The 
Japan Times, June 1, 1972. 
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The search by Japan for new sources of fuel comes 
with an increased reluctance to continued dependence on 
the Middle East as a major source of oil. In their 
search, the Japanese have concentrated on possible sources 
close to home. Recently, Japan financed a ten million 
dollar loan to Burma in an oil-drilling venture'that has 
produced exploration off the Burma coast in the Tenasserim 
area east of Ranqoon. There has even been talk in Japan 
of a trans-Andean pipeline which presumably would bring 
oil to the West Coast of South America for shipment by 
freighter to Japan. 3 However, it is in Indonesia, as 
Asia's only major oil producer,4 that Japan places its 
real hopes. On May 14, 1972, Japan and Indonesia 
jointly announced that the former country will provide a 
loan of some $218 million to help finance oil develop­
ment projects. In return, Japan was promised a steady 
supply of low-sulphur Indonesian oil through the next 
3 \ ' 
\'l'he New York Times, April 9, 1972, Section III. 
p. S. ~ 
~tn March of 1972, in a display of some unity, 
thdone,~a, Malaysia and Singapore suggested they might 
declar~rthe Malacca Straits joint inland waters (in 
order to control pollution and navagational hazards). 
The Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain 
all joined Japan in protest. The only great power to 
oppose the suggestion was China. The action on the part 
of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, in addition to 
other factors, may also be linked to a regional aware­
ness to the growth of Japanese influence in the area. 
See The New York Times, March 13, 1972, p. 9. 
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ten years. Moreover, an important discovery of fuel by 
Japan outside of the Soviet Union would greatly reduce 
the effectiveness of the Russian inducement in the 
Siberian project. 
Japan is currently also investing in other under­
developed regional areas. Once new agricultural sources 
have been located and secured, Japan will have eliminated 
another important area of dependency on the United 
States, which in the past, supplied a high proportion of 
these necessary agricultural goods to Japan. The Japanese 
expect such countries as Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
and Thailand to be able to provide these goods more 
5cheaply than does the U.S. The United States has in the 
past been the largest provider to Japan of such items, 
with an annual sales of over $1,000 million. In terms of 
major future Japanese investment, concentration will be 
in both China and South Korea for general agricultural 
items, Taiwan particularly for sugar, bananas, pineapples 
and tea, North Vietnam for corn, animals and feeds, 
South Vietnam for general investments, and Thailand, 
where the Japanese investment already doubles that of the 
u.S. 
5The Japan Times, June 7, 1972, p. 10. 
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In 1970, the greatest amount of world-wide aid 
from Japan went to South Korea, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Hongkong, and Taiwan, in that order. 6 Each 
of these three countries accounted for over 40 percent 
(
of Japan's total world-wide ou'tflow of aid. In mid­
1971, Japan was in the process of ,'increasing aid to 
Indonesia, Hongkong, and South Korea. 7 The lack of in­
crease in assistance to Taiwan and the Philippines can be 
explained, in the case of the former, by an improvement 
in relations with China, and in the case of the 
Philippines, by a general worsening of relations. 
Japan has been one of the most unpopular countries 
to attend the recent United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (l~CTAD), which began in mid-April of 
1972. At the conference, the poorer nations attempted to 
gain some adjustment of economic policies from the rich 
nations. China was partially successful in assuming 
leadership of the poorer nations, which included many 
from Asia. Although Japan supplied the world's second 
highest amount of total aid for 1971 ($1800 million), 
or 0.93 percent of Japan's Gross National Product and 
well abcve the 0.76 percent average,8 Tokyo was 








criticized for its use of commercial credits rather 
than grants and concessional loans. Moreover, govern­
ment loans from Japan have in the past been offered at 
3.6 	percent, a relatively high rate, with the world 
9 average at only 2.7 percent. The underdeveloped nations 
have also criticized Japan's "economic aggression," 
since government aid rose by a mere 5 percent in export 
credits.and capital investment, while private aid rose 
lOby 44 percent. 
In 1972, relations between Japan and the 
Philippines, much like recent Japan-U.S. relations, was 
at its lowest point since the Second World War. 
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and the 
Ambassador of Japan, Toshio Urabe, recently conferred 
over the growing anti-Japanese feeling among Filipinos. 
Following the conference, many Filipinos criticized 
Marcos for buckling unaer pressure. The critics charged 
that Japan had threatened to withdraw all financial as­
sistance from the Philippines if anti-Japanese feelings 
continued. ll Much like the rest of Asia, Japan is the 
object of distrust and fear among many Filipinos. This 
9Far East Economic Review, April 15, 1972, p. 48. 
lOIbid. 
lIThe Japan Times, April 4, 1972, p. 1. 
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negative reaction against yapan explains much of the 
'recent rise in pro-American,feelings. An example of 
the new orientation in Filipino attitudes is seen in the 
rapid growth of a Filipino organization claiming five 
t 
million members, desiring to make the Philippines 
America's 51st state. 12 
In contrast, Japan-Korean relations seem currently 
more solid. It is doubtful that in the near future 
Tokyo would to any degree shift its support from Seoul 
to Pyongyang. Several factors support this conclusion: 
(1) Japan has since 1965 recognized Seoul as the "sole 
legitimate government of Korea"; (2) tiqht financial 
relations exist between Tokyo and Seoul; (3) South 
Korea has a strong lobby with Japan's political leader­
ship; and, (4) South Korea has not been left exposed 
from the Nixon trip to China to the same degree, as has 
Taiwan. Although trade between Japan and North Korea 
continued to grow, doubling in value in 1971 and 1972, 
it fell far behind Japanese-South Korean trade. In 
1971, trade with North Korea was valued' at $60 million,13 
while Japanese trade with South Korea was about $1,000 
million. 




Far East Econom1c Rev1ew, February 12, 1972, p. 33. 
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Relations between the "twolf Vietnams is considered 
secondary to that of Japanese-Korean relations. On 
February 11, 1972, Japan dispatched two diplomats to 
Hanoi in the first government mission to that country. 
One result from the effort was to increase trade between 
the two countries, which in 1971, totaled at a value of 
only $17 million (but sho'\ved a strong increase of 30.8 
14percent). Japan's position in South Vietnam, as men­
tioned above, is a careful one, hoping for future invest­
ments but much contented with great economic gains al­
ready achieved. Japan looks hopefully forward to an ex­
pected role of providing great economic rehabilitation in 
both North and South Vietnam following the war. 
Until the reversion of Okinawa, Japan had terri­
torial claims against all of the Great Powers except 
the European Community. Following reversion, the pro­
blem of Okinawa changed from acquisition to administra­
tion, i.e., reversion changed only the nature of the pro­
blem in U.S.-Okinawa (Japan) relations. 
Territorial claims between China and Japan are com­
plicated by the inclusion of Taiwan as a part of the 
issue. The outstanding territorial problem between the 
three nations arose when oil deposits wer~ discovered in 
14
The Japan Times, April 8, 1972, p. 9. 
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November of 1970 off the China coast in the Senkaku 
(Tiao-yu) Island group. Claims to the Senkaku Islands 
have also been made by South Korea. The islands are un­
inhabited and had had little real value until the oil 
discovery. International law is unclear on the subiect 
and only urges the parties to meet and discuss the pro­
blem. Although American companies have often in the 
past joined with their Japanese counterparts to hunt for 
and develop oil discoveries,15 the u.s. government, not 
wishing to get involved in the argument, has warned 
several American oil companies not to become involved 
in explorations in the disputed region. 
The Senkaku Islands are situated at about the 
same distance from the northeastern tip of Taiwan as 
from the southern part of the Ryukyu Island chain 
(Japanese controlled since May 15, 1972). The islands, 
however, are about twice that distance from China proper 
and about four times that distance from the maior Japanese 
island of Kyushu. Since Japan claims the Senkakus are 
included as part of the Ryukyu Islands reverted by the 
United States on May 15, 1972, the Japanese had hoped for 
a stronger American statement in their favor. The 
American position has been, however, that the problem 
15For example, see Japan Report, Vol. XVII, No. 17, 
September 1, 1971, p. 8. 
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should be settled by the countries concerned. Although 
~he Japanese government has thre~tened to take a hard 
line (for example, by the strengthening of naval patrols 
in the vicinity), it is likely that an eventual compromise 
will be reached by all concerned. An example in modera­
tion was made by the Japan Times, which advised that 
although there: 
is absolutely no question about the terri­
torial status of the Senkaku Islands • • • 
since it is the oil that has brought forth 
the fallacious claims to Taipei and Peking, 
we should not close our ears-- aside from 
the territorial issue-- to the possibilities 
of carrying out a joint international ex­
ploration of the seabed resources in the area 
around Japan's Senkaku Islands. 16 
The People's Republic of China, like Japan, imports 
oil from the Middle East. Also, as in the case of Japan, 
the Chinese need for oil in the near future is projected 
to expand greatly. Regarding the inclusion of the 
Senkaku Islands as part of the Okinawa reversion, the 
Chinese position has been that the United States which 
occupied, 
Japan's Okinawa after World War II, should 
return Okinawa to Japan completely and un­
conditionally. But it has no right at all 
to include China's terri~ory Taioyu Island 
and other islands under its illegal occupa­
tion in the 'area of reversion. '17 
l6Th~ Japan Times, March 10, 1972, p. 14. 
l7peking Review, January 7, 1972, p. 14. 
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In July of 1970, the Chinese charged that a Ryuku 
coastal patrol ship had sailed to the Senkaku Islands 
and "illegally set up markers there indicating they be­
long to the Ryuku group. n • ,By also. including the is ­
lands in Japan's "air defense', ~dentification zone," 
Japanese "militarism is once again trying to occupy and 
annex China's territory by armed force. n18 
One of China's first actions following its accep­
tance into the United Nations was to accuse Japan of 
plundering China's coastal resources. On March 3, 1972, 
Japan was accused in the General Assembly's Committee on 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor of ' comb in­
ing with the United States and Taiwan to plunder China's 
coastal seaded. An Chin-yuan, the delegate from China, 
declared that: 
The United States is to this date forci­
bly occupying China's territory in Taiwan 
Province and of late it has colluded "~li th 
the Jap8nese reactionaries and used the 
fraud of the reversion of Okinawa in an at ­
tempt to conclude into Ja~pan 1 s territory the 
Taioyu (Senkaku) and other islands pertain­
.ing to China's Taiwan Province. 
The conflict over the Senkaku Islands includes not 
only Japan and tbe People's Republic of China. The 
Nationalist government of Taiwan also claims the 
l8Ibid • 
19The Japan {rimes" March 51 19721 p. 1. 
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territories for "China." As in the case of Japan, Taiwan 
has tried to influence the United states into taking a 
stand in its favor on the islands issue, and like Japan, 
has failed. On April 10 and 11, 1971, Chinese and 
Chinese-Americans went into the streets of Washington, 
D. C. , and other American cities in support of both 
Taiwan's and China's claims to the islands (in direct 
OppOS1. t'10n t 0 Japanese cl'a1ms ) • 20 On May 23rd, a full 
page advertisement appeared appealing to President Nixon 
and the members of Congress urging the American govern­
ment to: (1) disavow any claims that the Senkaku Is­
lands as ever being any part of the American administered 
Ryukyu Islands; (2) recognize Chinese sovereignty over the 
islands; and, (3) censure actions by the Japanese govern­
ment which "viol~tes" Chinese sovereiqnty.21 
The problem of the Senkaku Islands has been com­
plicated by the larger 
I 
and more important question in 
Japanese politics of the status of Taiwan itself, especial­
ly since the Nixon visit to China. The Japanese, follow­
ing the Nixon "China-shock," feared a new American policy 
of rapprochement with China, leaving Japan behind and 
isolated. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek 
20The New York Times. April 12. 1971, p. 9. 
21 bOd 2 1~., May 3, 971. p. 30. 
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on Taiwan has long been the Far Eastern symbol of the 
Cold War. While the 84-ye~r old Chiang has ruled the 
Republic of China for over a quarter of a century, 
Japanese foreign policy can no longer afford to await 
the pleasure of his retirement "a·n'd a possible change in 
policy. Taiwan is the most important problem to be 
solved prior to any normalization in Japan-China rela­
tions. 
The United States is not the only maior power to 
have altered its policies towards China and against 
Taiwan. For example, Great Britain on March 13, 1972, 
decided to remove its official representation from 
Taipei and to enter into full-scale relations with 
Peking. At the same time, the British acknowledge lithe 
position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a pro­
vince of the People's Republic of China. n22 
How important is Taiwan to Japan's economy? 
Taiwan has generally sold to Japan agricultural products 
in return for processed raw materials, machinery, and 
iron and steel. Lately, the increased industrialization 
in Taiwan has commensurably increased Taiwanese exports 
of new goods (e.g., light industry ftems), to Japanese 
markets. Total trade with Taiwan was $1.034 million iq 
22The Japan Time~, March 17, 1972, p. 16. 
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1971, exceeding China-Japan trade. It was also re­
ported that more Japanese tourists were going in 1971 
to Taiwan than any other country in the world. In 1971, 
the total number of Japanese tourists going to Taiwan 
was 255,000, up 44.1 percent from the 1970 total. At 
the same time, the total number of American tourists 
going to Taiwan in 1971 dropped by 8.5 percent from 
23
1970. 
There is some disagreement over the amount of 
Japanese investment in Taiwan. Some "conservative" 
estimates put Japan's investment levels for 1971 at 
about $100 million. 24 For the single year 1971, 
Japanese investment dropped from the 1970 level of 
51 investment cases with a total value of $28.5 million, 
to only 18 cases of investment proiects totaled in value 
at $12.4 ml.·11l.·on.25 N the 1 J apan . 1971 s tOllever ess, l.n l. 
provided the world's largest amount of technological aid 
to Taiwan (79 out of 102 total cases of technological 
cooperation contracts).26 The significance of these 





The Japan Times Weekly, Harch 18, 1972, p. 9". 
26 
. The Japan Times, May 22, 1972, p. 12. 
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figures is that while Japane~e trade and investment in 
Taiwan for 1971 displayed a downswing reflecting the 
change in Japan's attitudes on the "Taiwan question,lI 
the total effect was not as drastic as some had pre­
viously suggested might occur. 
On October 8, 1971, Peking spelled out a modified 
set of conditions in any normalization of relations with 
Japan. 27 The text of conditions was enumerated in a 
joint communique signed the previous day in Peking with 
a group of visiting legislators from Japan. The joint 
communique agreed that relations should be established 
between Japan and China "at the earliest possible 
date," and on the basis that Japan drop its relations 
with the Nationalist qovernment on Taiwan including the 
abrogation of the peace treaty. Officially, the Peking 
government is still at war with Tokyo, having nev~r 
signed a peace treaty following the conclusion of hos­
tilities. The joint communique showed a moderating 
Chinese position, since they did not mention the ques­
tion of war reparations, possibly amounting to billions 
of dollars. Neither did they mention the question of 
the Japanese-American defense treaty. 




In the following month of November, in an inter­
view with Moto Goto, the managing editor of Asahi 
Shimbun (one of Japan's major newspapers), Premier 
Chou En-lai of China reiterated the basic 1nd primary 
importance of setting the Taiwan question prior to 
Japan-China normalization. 28 The Chinese Premier 
told the Japanese newspaper editor that: 
it is necessary for the Japanese govern­
ment to outline a clear-cut attitude on 
the Taiwan question • • . the Japan­
Taiwan treaty must be abrogated \vithout 
fail. 
The Japanese Socialist Party, the Komeito party, and the 
Democratic Socialist Party, on the following day, sub­
mitted a resolution that would give recognition to 
29China on Peking's terms. The Japanese Communist Party 
gave only "reluctant support" to the measure. 
Specifically, Peking's demands for normalization 
are all related to Taiwan and are based on China's 
"three principles": first, to recognize the government 
of the People's Republic of China as the only legal 
government of China; second, to declare that Taiwanese 
self-determination or independence movements are un­
acceptable; and third, to declare the peace treaty of 






1951 bet\veen Japan and Taiwan invalid. 
One of the ~ost dist~r~ing stateme~ts by a leader 
I 
of Japan ever made public to China since the 1951 peace 
treaty with Taiwan was made 'by Prime Minister Sato in 
November of 1969. After having'\'inet with President Nixon, 
Sate declared that the "security in the Taiwan area to 
. f' . f ,.30be a most ~mportant actor ~n the secur~ty 0 Japan.' 
The reaction to Sato's speech in the Chinese press was 
instantaneous. For example. the newspapers Jen-min Jih­
pao, Hung-ch'i and Chieh-fang-chun Pao pointed out in 
their editorial: 
It has long been our consistent policy to 
develop diplomatic relations with all 
countries on the basis of the five prin­
cipals of peaceful co-existence. but on no 
account can we tolerate the invasion and 
occupatior:, of our sacred terri tory by any 
imperialism or social-imperialism. We are 
determined to liberate Taiwan. u.S. im­
perialism and Japan militarism had bet~Ir 
consider this paragraph more carefully. 
In another example, the Chinese media claimed that 
at the Sato-Nixon meeting in November of 1969, the two 
leaders had decided to go, 
30For the complete text see The Ne~ York Times, 
November 22, 1969, p. 14. 
31"u.s. Nevlsman on Japanese ~1ilitarists' Territorial 
Designs on Taiwan," Survey of China 1-1ainland Press, NQ. 
4592 (from Hong Kong Press, Ta Kung Pao, on February 2, 
1970), Hongkong: u.s. Consulate General, February 5,1970, 
p. 128. 
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so far as to include China's sacred ter­
ritory Taiwan province within Japan's 
sphere of incluence, flagrantly clamour­
ing that they would prevent the Chinese 
people from liberating Taiwan. At the 
same time, Eisaku Sato also sent his 
brother Nobusuka Kishi, a first-class 
war criminal, to Taiwan for conspira­
torial activities. All of these facts 
have further exposed the rabid ambitions 
of the Japanese reactionsaries to re­
occupy China's sacred territory Taiwan. 32 
Two years later, in 1972, the official Chinese 
position had not changed: 
Sato reaffirmed time and time again after 
his talks with Nixon that the 'U.S.-Japan 
security system is needed,' that 'the 
system will be persisted in,' and that 
'it can be stated explicitly that Taiwan 
is not excluded from the area3~f the U.S.­
Japan security treaty system. 
Where Chinese attitudes had altered concerned the 
recent thawing in Soviet-Japanese relations, awakening 
the worst in China's fears. Peking accused Japan of 
conspiring with the Soviets on the anti-China issue, 
and even being instigated by the Russians to occupy by 
force "China's sacred territory,lI Taiwan. 34 
To a great extent, the Chinese were able to use 
the Nixon "China-shock" to their advantage and against 
32Ibid., "Reactionary Japanese Government Rabidly 
. Opposes China in Collusion with u.s. Imperialism," (New 
'China News Agency-English, Peking, December 27, 1969)", 
No. 4569, January 5, 1970. 
33"Peking Review, No.4, January 28, 1972, p. 21. 
34Ibi.d~, No.6, February 11, 1972, p. 19. 
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the Japanese. During the Nixon visit, the Chinese 
toughened their recent language against the exposed 
"Japanese, including that concerning the Taiwan 
question: 
The Japanese militarists have become more 
frenzied since the latter part of 1971 in 
the"ir sinister manoeuvers to annex China's 
Taiwan Province. They have whipped up pu­
blic opinion and recruited followers for 
creating an 'independent Taiwan' and even 
chosen the main actors for the performance. 
Nearly all these dirty moves are directly 
or indirectly connected with Japanese 
Prime Minister Sato, Foreign Minister 
Fukuda and arch war criminal Kishi . 
The Japanese reactionaries • . • are 
attempting to create an 'independent 
Taiwan' through a bunch of Chinese trai ­
tors in their pay, so as to reduce Taiwan 
to a Japanese colony again. Such a tactic 
is indeed identical with the devilish 
stratagem of Japanese imperialists in 
rigging up 'Hanchukuo' more than 40 years 
ago! Sato and his ilk . • . are wor.thv 
d o ° 1 f ° 351SC1P es 0 To]o. • • . 
In response to the attacks from China, from the 
opposition parties, and from many groups and organiza­
tions in Japan, Prime Minister Sato on March I, 1972, 
modified his previous position saying that now he fully 
recognized Peking's territorial claims over Taiwan. This 
statement represented a major shift within "Sato's para­
dox." While forces were building in Japan for normali­
za.tion of relations with China, the pre-conditions 
35Ibid., Nos. 7-8, February 25, 1972, pp. 27-28. 
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set by Peking meant nothing less than a complete Japanese 
sell-out of Taiwan. The Nixon "China-shock" gave Sato 
the pretext of doinq what he could never had dared be­
fore: move in bold directions' towards a China accomrnoda-
I 
tion and away from the tattered"~ies with Taiwan, an 
issue that was splitting the intern'al political cohesion 
within Japan and within the Liberal Democratic Party. In 
1971, Sato had admitted that it was: 
~ot an overstatement to say that Japan re­
lations with China form the core of Japanese 
diplomacy, but he could offer no formula 
whereby Japan could improve relations with 
Peking while maintaining relations with 
Taiwan. 36 
Unfortunately for Sato, his respite had 'come too 
late, his political support at home long since having 
dissipated in strength. In addition, China refused to 
deal with Sato or his Government, preferring to wait 
until his successor (Tanaka) had been named. The Nixon 
"China-shock" had inadvertently helped Mr. Sato out of his 
paradox over the Taiwan commitment, but somewhat ironi­
cally it had also had helped him out of office. 
__ __ __ 1mes, uanuary, , p. •36The New York T" T 1 1971 1 
CHAP~ER: VII 
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
Several of the most impo~tant problems between 
Japan and China in '1972 were: (l) the Japan-U. S. 
Security TreatYi (2) the growth of Japanese militarism; 
(3) Japan's relations with Taiwan and South Korea; (4) 
the economic expansion of Japan, particularly in Asia; 
and, (5) the fear in China of any economic, political 
or military understanding between Japan and the Soviet 
Union. 
To some degree, China and Japan share the same 
Confucian culture and conunon racial characteristics. 
But in many ways Japan has had more in 
conunon with Europe than with China. Per­
haps this dissimilarity is more obvious 
to the Asian eye than to the European. l 
Nevertheless, China's relations with Japan have, since 
the early 1960's, been better than with either of the 
other two Asian Great PO'tvers. In 1957, Chou En-lai had 
said that the Chinese did not object to Japan's relations 
with the United States, but "what they did not approve of 
was their one-sidedness and Japan's refusal to develop 
lpyong-choon, p. 343. 
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friendly relations with China."2 By 1958, the Chinese 
government had: 
adopted an attitude of uncompromising op­
position to the Japanese government and 
encouraged a mass struggle against it. 
The reasons for this shift may be sought 
in the Chinese calculations about the im­
possibility of developing relations with 
Japan without a prior expulsion of 
American influence, their hopes about 
the possibilities of realizing this ob­
jective, and their faith in their capa­
city to impress Japan with China's new 
power. 3 
\ 
During the mid-1960's, China's image and influence 
in Japan suffered, primarily from Peking's own behavior. 
with the main exception of the extreme left-wing organi­
zations, Japanese public opinion was adversly affected 
by such factors as China's development of nuclear wea­
pons, its wars of liberation, its real or supposed role 
with the Communist Party in Indonesia, and the results 
from the. excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Japan-
China relations were also negatively affected with the 
coming to power of Sato. 
Yet in the following four years Peking's 
concern with the more immediate problems 
of the Indochina war, border clashes with 
the Soviet Union, and the Cultural Revolu­
tion tended to push Japan into the back­
ground of its foreign policy considerations. 
2Dutt, p. 233. 
3 . 
Ibid., p. 234. 
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When the Chinese did discuss Japan it 
was usually in terms of American or 
Soviet 'collaboration. ,4 
In addition, the: 
major Soviet diplomatic and economic 
offensive throughout Southeast Asia 
and Moscow' 'S call for an Asian col­
lective security pact were both inter­
preted in Peking as an elaborate 
policy of containment dependent on a 
Moscow-Tokyo axis.5 
What China specifically fears is that Japan may 
decide to meet what Prime Minister Sato has called, 
Japan's lIinternational obligations." In an article for 
the Chinese newspaper Jen-min Jih-pao in January of.1970, 
6Peking outlined its fears of Japanese power-emergence. 
The Sato administration has always fol­
lowed u.S. imperialism, colluded with the 
Soviet revisionists and reactionaries of 
all countries, remained hostile toward 
China, and opposed to the national demo­
cratic revolutionary movements of the 
peoples of all Asian countries. The Sato 
administration continues to 'uphold' the 
'Japan-U.S. 'Security Pact,' or the Japan­
u.S. military alliance. which points its 
spearhead against socialist China and the 
countries in Asia, steps 'up Japan-U.S. 
military collusion under the camouflage 
of the 'return of Okinawa,' and further 
ties Japan on the chariot of aggression 
4
Saywel1, p. 513. 
5Ibid . 
6"Refutation of Sato's Clamor for So-called 
'Fulfillment of International Obligations,' II Survey 2i. 
China Mainland Press, No. 4596 (Peking Jen-min Jin-}?aO, 
January 30, 1970), Hongkong: U.Se Consulate General, 
February 13, 1970, pp. 122-123. 
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of u.s. imperialism. In response to 

Nixon's so-called 'New Asian Policy' the 

Sato administration actively serves as the 

military police in Asia in a futile attempt 

to round up the reactionaries of all coun­

tries to establish a clique of military ag­

gression backed by the United States and 

using Japan as the 'backbone' to act inim­

ically against the people of China and 

other Asian countries. This is the 'inter­

national obligations' which the Japanese 

reactionaries want to 'fulfill'! 

Waving the banner of 'sovereignty and de­

fense,' Japanese reactionaries energetically 

expand armament and prepare for war, clamor­

ing to engage in 'localized' wars of aggres­

sion by using the 'Self-Defense Force (Note: 

i.e., the Japanese Army, Navy and Air Force) 

as the principal force' with the support of 

u.s. imperialism. They also clamored about 

sending their fleet to 'defend' the Strait 

of Malacca and establish their power at sea. 

These are the 'international obligations' 





Japanese reactionaries included Chinese terri ­
tory, Taiwan Province, Korea, Indo-china, etc., 
into Japan's sphere of 'defense' and clamored 
to use force to hinder the Chinese people in 
. their liberation of their own territory of 
Taiwan Province and to engage in aggressive 
adventures against Korea and other areas. 
These are the 'international obligations' 
which the Japanese reactionaries want to 
'fulfill' ! 
Waving the banner of 'cooperation' and 'aid 
for development' the Japanese reactionaries 
engage in economic expansion and infiltration 
against countries in Southeast Asia, rob them 
of their resources, ruin the local national 
industries, control their economy, and striv~ 
to include these countries into Japan's sphere 
of colonization so as to renew their dream of 
'Greater East Asian Sphere of Co-prosperity.' 
These are the 'international obligations' which 
the Japanese reactionaries want to 'fulfill'! 
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Memory is still fresh in the minds of the 
people in Asia and the Pacific area about 
the Japanese militarists' launching of the 
war of aggression and their crimes of slaugh­
tering and robbing the people of Asia. They 
are highly vigilant against the aggressive 
designs of the Japanese reactionaries. Acts 
of aggressive expansion by the Japanese reac­
tionaries in Asia and the Pacific area can 
only arouse strong resistance and counter­
attack from the people in Asia and the Pacific 
area which will make the Japanese reaction­
aries encircled by the people of all countries. 
Great leader Chairman ~1ao pointed out: 'Im­
perialist wolves must remember, the era when 
they were free to change the fate of mankind 
and rape the countries in Asia and Africa has 
gone forever and will never return.' 
Japan is the only Asian nation which can clearly 
offer both economic and military superiority to China's 
self-image as the leader of Asia. 
As a status-quo power bent on internal 
development and the enhancement of re­
gional stability through the maintenance 
of non-communist neighbors, Tokyo pre­
sents a long-t,erm obstacle to Peking's 
regional influence a~bitions. Chinese 
foreign-policy-makers seem particularly 
sensitive to Japan's efforts at regional 
leadership through such organizations as 
the Asia-Pacific Council- (ASPAC) and its 
hosting of a nunmer of re~ional conferences 
beginning in 1966 • • • • 
Japan 1 s military alliance with the United States has 
long been a sore point with China. This is basically 
7S • w. Simon, "Some Aspects of China's Asian 
Policy in the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath," 
Pacific Affairs (Spring 1971), p. 30. 
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been because the alliance is seen by China as merely a 
device for Japan to further its resumption of rearmament. 
Now however, the situation may have reversed itself, 
with the Security Treaty offering to China perhaps the 
only viable alternative to complete Japanese rearmament. 
Today, China faces a new problem of imponderable impor­
tance: the growing threat of cooperation between Japan 
and the Soviet Union, far more dangerous to China than 
any Japanese-American alliance. 
If Japan does decide to rearm completely, there is 
very little China can do to prevent it. The alternatives 
of the People's Republic of China to, 
offset Soviet and American influence in 
Japan is very limited, consisting primarily 
of trade blandishments and appeals to 
segments of the Japanese Communist and 
Socialist Parties, neither of which has 
much foreign policy leverage. 8 
Chinese internal and external propaganda has always 
distinquished between the rulers of Japan and the 
Japanese people. An often quoted statement, made origin­
ally in January of 1964 by Chairman Mao, demonstrates this: 
Japan is a great nation. It will certainly 
not allow U.S. imperialism to ride rough­
shod over it for long. The last few years 
have seen the constant broadening of the 
patriotic united front of all strata the 
Japanese people against U.S. imperialist 
8Ibid., p. 31. 
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aggression, oppression and control. This 
is the surest guarantee of victory in their 
patriotic struggle agains~ U.S. imperial­
ism. The Chinese people are convinced that 
the Japanese people will be able to drive 
the U.s. imperialists from their soil and 
realize their aspirations for ind9pendence, democracy, peace, and neutrality. 
More recently, in the case of Taiwan's status, 
Peking's "people to people offensive" has stated that: 
The Chinese people will never allow any 
. outside interference in this matter. This 
just stand of the Chinese people has en­
joyed wide and resolute support from the 
Japanese people. The Japanese people de­
mand for the restoration of diplomatic re­
lations between Japan and China and the 
development of Japan-China friendship is 
like a mighty torrent surging ahead irresis­
tibly. Sato's deliberate design to antagonize 
the Chinese people and carry out the 'two­
Chinas' plot and his ambition to commit ag­
gression on China's territory Taiwan are 
doomed to fail.lO . 
Although less recently since the Nixon visit, 
China has had in the past, the advantage of appealing as 
a utopia to alienated'students and intellectuals. ll For 
example, Peking claimed that after 1965, "a new leap 
took place and a new situation appeared," as groups of 
9"Japanese People's Just Patriotic Struggle 
Against u.s. Imperialism Rolls On," Survey of China 
Mainland Press, No. 4590 (Peking, January 27; 1970) , 
Hongkong: u.S. Consulate General, February 3, 1970, 
p. 58. 
10. .
Pekl.ng Revl.ew, March 10, 1972, no. 10, p. 17. 
11 .
Hl.nton, p. 234. 
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workers and students were organized to fight in the 
struggle. In many places o~ J.apan, since lithe autumn 
of 1967, the courageous and revolutionary Japanese 
people • have engaged in'a series of fierce strug­
gles with the repressive reactionaries and armed police.,,12 
In 1972, the extreme character of such organizations and 
their violence had alienated most Japanese of any 
sympathy. 
The general policy of China had been to rollout 
the red carpet for almost any visiting Japanese who 
opposed Sato, in or out of government. Inter-party 
Communist relations between China and Japan retained, 
in 1972, the hostile character established earlier in 
the decade. T~e leaders of China had recognized ear­
lier that they would have to work, 
not through the JCP but through the 
Socialist Party which was the dominant 
opposition in the country and through 
their trade union organization SOHYO. 
Peking's task was facilitated by the 
fact that both these organizations were 
uncompromisingly against the military 
alliance with the United States and the 
retention of U.S. bases on Japanese soil 
and were emotionally pro-Chinese. 13 
Four recent developments have heightened Chinese 
12




Dut t , P • 239. 
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consternation over Japan ',s role in Asia: (1) the 
Sato-Johnson 1967 talks on Apian security: (2) the 
Nixon Guam doctrine of mid-1969, increasing Japan's 
role in Asia; (3) the NoverOber 1969 Sato-Nixon talks, 
in which Taiwan's and South Korea's independence was 
linked to Japan; and (4) the June 1970 Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty. At a time when economic intercourse 
is rapidly expanding between the two countries, China 
remains jealous and in fear of Japanese diplomatic and 
commercial successes in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and 
quite possibly, Siberia. In addition, while Japan 
fears China's nuclear weapons, the Chinese ~orry con­
tinuously over the possible remilitarization of Japan. 
Moreover, fo~lowing the disasters of the "united 
front" (conducted on official levels), the Peking 
Government has since aligned itself with the revolu­
tionary masses of various Asian countries. Japan was 
seen in China as only an Asian image of American 
imperialism. 14 
Another problem of Japan-China relations has 
been the growing nationalism in both countries, which 
may in the future hamper efforts to reach a solution 
14LaFeber, p. 144. 
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of the important questions. lS Largely, security in 
Asia will depend upon the future course of Japanese 
domestic politics and upon the ability of the ruling 
governments to keep excessive nationalistic feelings 
under IIcontrol.1I Quite possibly, 
the very considerable cultural and racial 
affinity between China and Japan may one 
day provide a basis for removing today's 
conflicts. This would, of course, be con­
tingent upon Japan's recognition of China's 
claims to be the senior partner, and the 
chances in the present decade of such a 
Sino-Japanese rapprochement are very small
26 .. . . . 
China's strength as both a conventional and nuclear 
power has been a factor of Asian politics for some time. 
The People's Republic of China's, 
capability projected into the 1970's seems 
formidable; a limited number of kiloton and 
megaton \veapons relative to the U. S. and 
the U.S.S.R., and a limited delivery capa­
bility, yet one which could reach to other 
parts of mainland Asia, Asiatic U.S.S.R., 
Japan and the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the 
Philippines. 17 
Yet, the critical question is of '~intent,n and the 
desire to initiate aggression on the part of the regime 
in China has yet to be proven a fact. The conventional 
15.:;oachim G1aubitz, "l·loscow-Peking-Tokyo: A 
Triangle of Great Power Relations," Institute for the 
Study of the U.S.S.R. Bulletin (June 1971), p.~.---
16 0dIbl. ., p. 32. 
17J • H. Buck, "Japan's Defense Options for the 
1970's," Asian Survey (October 1970), p. 894. 
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strength of the Chinese military against any other 
Great Power is found in its defensive depth; less in 
any offensive projection. This has at least been the 
general attitude of the Japanese and they seem little 
worried, having developed a policy of nwait and see. nIB 
Trade pressure, next to the political parties, 
may be China's most powerful influence within Japan. 
Although the Chinese position has basically always been 
that economic intercourse and political relations could 
never be separated, throughout the 1960's and into the 
1970's, Japan has been able to hold economic intercourse 
with China without solving the difficult political and 
ideological questions. During a speech to the Diet in 
March of 1967, Prime Minister Sato said that his policy 
vis-a-vis China would be to "separate politics from 
economics. n19 In fact, however, this had been the policy 
of Japan since the early 1950's. 
Generally, the attitude of the average Japanese 
businessman has been swayed by economic rather than 
political considerations. In addition, because, 
of the large memberships and diverse com­
positions of these associations, they are 
18Storry, p. 333. 
19The Japan T;mes, March 15 1967 P 1--. " . . 
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not unanimous conqerning the China issue. 
But the general attitude of. these busi­
ness groups is to promote trade with 
Communist China, but not officially to 
recognize it. 20 
The Chinese, on the other hand, "are so completely 
~ 
swayed by political feelings that th~y have allowed 
their distrust of Japan to enter 'into their considera­
tion of commercial matters. n2l For example, in 1962, 
after having realized the growing economic power and 
independence of Japan, Peking dropped its earlier con­
ditions and again gave its consent to renew private 
trade between the two countries. 22 
In 1968, China for the first time insisted on 
political statements being included within the annual 
trade agreements. It was from the Cultural Revolution 
that the Chinese trade negotiators adopted a rigid and 
doctrinaire attitude in trade dealings with Ja~an. The 
general decline which Japanese-Chinese trade experienced 
in that year was brought about since the Japanese were 
unwilling to purchase China's exportable items (rice, 
iron ores, tobacco and livestock). What Japan wanted, 
20Jan, p. 611. 

21Lee , p. 137. 





but China could not export, was such materials as 
coal and corn. In addition, at the time Japan was fol­
lowing a rigid economic policy. Because of the re­
gulations in the use of Export-Import Bank funds, 
China was unable to borrow from Japan, turning to 
Western Europe instead. 
In April of 1970, China took a maior step in its 
continuing attempts to influence Japan's trade policies. 
Premier Chou En-lai declared the future would see 
China refusing to have any dealings with foreign firms 
who thereafter dealt \vith or invested in Taiwan or 
South Korea. delivered weapons to South Vietnam, or 
were partners with U.S.' firms. liThe alacrity with which 
the majority of Japanese firms complied with the 
Chinese demands were surprising," and Peking "has at 
its disposal an instrument with which to exert political 
pressure upon Japan and influence her economic relations 
with her neighbors.,,23 
Upon returning from Peking in November of 1971, 
a delegation of ranking Japanese businessmen reported 
that trade between the two countries would grow, but 
only gradually. The influential character of the group's 
23G1a00°~tz, p. 28 • 
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composition was a reflection of the qrowing importance 
of the China trade to Japan's economy. 
Yoshizane Iwasa, president of the Fuji 
Bank, a member of the mission, said in 
an interview that within the next two 
or three years it would be difficult to 
achieve a radically fast increase in 
trade between China and Japan. However, 
he forecast a 'gradual increase year by 
year.' Mr. Iwasa said that the Chinese 
had explained that they wanted to develop 
their industry with their own initiative. 24 
They want to stand on their own feet • • • 
In February of 1972, the Japanese Government came 
to a major policy alteration. It was decided then to 
approve future applications for Export-Import Bank 
credits to China. The Government had previously re­
fused to permit use of the bank's funds for trade with 
China because of a private promise to this effect made 
by the late former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in a 
letter to the Taipei Government in 1964. 
Continued liberalization of trade policy seems to 
be a part of Japan's future attitude with China. 
The scope for economic cooperation appears 
boundless. Japan has much to offer in 
helping to develop the Chinese heavy, 
petrochemical, synthetic fibre, and ele­
tric power industries which are high on 
China's economic plan. 25 
24The New York Times, November 28, 1971, p. 1. 
25Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 45. 
139 
In 1971, total trade between China and Japan increased 
9.4 percent over 1970. Of 'this, Chinese exports of raw 
silk doubled to become the top export item to Japan. 
China's biqgest imports are iron and steel materials, 
~', 
" chemicals, machines, and raw materials for textile 
manufacturing. 
Trade between China and Japan is probably more 
important to the former, since Japan has been accurnula­
tinq a trade surplus, and with the exception of raw silk 
and soy beans, none of the principal items imported 
from China are in any real demand. In fact, Japan must 
find new items from China to import. 
To boost exports to Japan, China needs 
to follow international trade practices 
in respect to pricing, quality control, 
designing and shippinq. Richly endowed 
with natural resources, it could meet 
many of the needs of the humming Japanese 
manufacturing industries if its products 
were competitive-- if it really made the 
decision to export them. 26 
If this decision were made, Japan could help to in­
dustrialize China, while the latter, in turn, could 
supply badly needed natural resources. 
It has, however, been the very success of Japan's 
economy that has added to the problems of Japan-China 
26 Ibid • 
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relations. One such aspect is: 
Peking's fear that Japan is becoming a 
paramount and anti-Chinese power in 
Southeast Asia. Japan is Indonesia's 
number one trading partner; she domi­
nates Thailand's transportation, tex­
tile, and iron and steel industries; and 
is a leading economic power in such key 
areas as Malaya, Burma, and even 
Australia. The Japanese realize that 
if any military is flashed in support 
of this economic expansion, it will 
arouse memories of the hated Japanese 
occupation and Co-Prosperity Sphere in 
Southeast Asia. The Chinese constantly 
play on such memories, but so far with­
out much effect. 27 
The "Okinawanization of Japan" is seen as part 
of a new phase in Japanese imperialism, edging closer 
to outright militarism. Peking sees the reversion of 
Okinawa as part of the American policy of letting 
Asians fight Asians. 
Through the Okinawan 'reversion' fraud, the 
United States and Japan hope to tone down 
the struggle pf the Asian people, the 
Japanese people in particular~ against the 
U.S.-Japanese reactionaries.2~ 
To neutralize the actual or imagined military 
threat from Japan, China, as one possibility, would un­
officially like to see a four-power nonaggression pact 
with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. 29 In 
27LaFeber, pp. 146 and 178. 
28 k" 28 1972 4 2Pe 1ng Rev1ew, January, , No. ,pp. 0-21. 
29Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 28. 
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addition to with the fear of a remilitarized Japan, 
also exists a fear of a Japan-Soviet alliance. Given 
the choice, China would unquestionably prefer the U.S.­
Japan Security Treaty to any Moscow-Tokyo alliance. It 
is with the Soviet Union that China now competes in at ­
tracting Japan, followinq the qrowing Japanese disparity 
with the U.S. If the proposed Siberian project serves as 
the greatest Soviet enticement, it is the northern ter­
ritories issue that acts as the qreatest hinderance. 
China continues to play to the latter theme, irritating 
the Russians, while supportinq the demands of Japan. 
One sympathizer of the Soviet Union concluded that the, 
Chinese leaders are blackmailing Ja.pan's 
ruling circles with the poeibly anti-Japanese 
trend of the newly-emerging Chines(;~-U. S. 
rapprochement. They domonstrate to the 
Japanese ruling circles their blatant anti ­
Sovietism and solidarity on the 'Northern 
territories' issue. the solidarity on \vhich 
Japan may allegedly rely in bringing pres­
sure to bear on the Soviet Union. 30 
30n. Yostokov, liThe Foreign Policy of the People's 
Republic of China Since the Ninth Congress of the 
Communist Party of China," International Affairs (January 
1972), p. 31. 
CHAPTER VIII 
JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS 
Throughout the post-war period and until the 
Nixon visit to China, Russo-Japanese relations had 
generally been poor. Since the China-U.S. "detente," 
relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have 
improved. The improvement in relations with Japan has 
come about from what can be termed a Russian "goodwill­
offensive." At a time when American-Japanese relations 
are at their weakest point in the post-war era, Soviet­
Japanese relations are at their strongest. 
The Soviet Union had been a leader among those 
Asian nations who did not favor the revitalization of 
Japan following the conclusion of the Second World War. 
A formal peace treaty between the two countries has 
never been concluded. Instead, a joint Russo-Japanese 
"peace declaration" was signed on October 19, 1956. 
Agreed to in the declaration was a technical end to the 
state of war. The signinq of the docl~ent also provided 
for: the opening of diplomatic and consular relations 
between the two countries, Japan was to receive Soviet 
support for united Nations membership, ~1oscow was to 
repatriate Japanese nationals, and both countries were 
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to drop certain respective claims against the other. 
Moreover, it was agreed that ,Japan and the Soviet 
Union would begin talks for future trade agreements, 
fisheries conventions, and hopefully, a formal treaty
t. 
" of peace. While some of these.expectations were even­
tually realized (e.g., in a trade agreement signed in 
1963 and extending through 1966, an estimated exchange 
of some $700,000,000 worth of goods were called for); 
as of mid-1972, a formal peace treaty had not yet been 
. d 1 
s~gne • As in the case of China, strong economic ties 
between Japan and the Soviet Union have not led·directly 
to equally strong political ties. 
Part of the recent Russian policy in Asia has 
consisted of the Erezhnev Collective Security Plan. At 
a time when the shift in emphasis of Soviet foreign 
policy has meant a relaxation of relations wit~ Europe 
and the United States in the West, the critical problem 
of the Sino-Soviet conflict~ remains. After having 
originally expressed his collective security plan at the 
International Communist Party Conference in June of 1969, 
Brezhnev, in a speech in March of 1971, again expressed 
interest amid a "massive media campaign directed at 
INegotiations designed to arrive at a formal 
peace treaty are expected to begin in late 1972. 
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building closer Soviet-Japanese relations. 1I2 Moreover, 
after a period of apparent oblivion, the: 
resurgence of this theme in the Soviet 
media cdncides with the reactivation of 
~1oscow I s Asian policy. Diplomatic ef­
forts toward closer relations are fore­
seen. But no spectacular breakthroughs 
in that direction should be expected 
until presently prevailing circumstances 
in the area undergo serious changes. 3 
In April of 1971, at the 24th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary 
Brezhnev re-enumerated his collective security plan. It 
called for the prohibition in the exercising of military 
power among Asian nations, the respect of national 
sovereignty and nonaggression against other nations' 
borders, the noninterference in other nations' domestic 
affairs, and, the promotion of cooperation in economic 
and other spheres based on equality and mutual benefit. 
Advantageously amplifying this spirit, Radio Moscow on 
May 16,1972 (the day following reversion), called on 
Okinawa to be made free of nuclear weapons and to be 
completely demi1itarized. 4 
2 	 . 
The Japan Times Weekly, May 27, 1972, p. 4. 
3Jean Rio11ot. "Moscow and Asian Collective 
Security," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 14, 1971, 
p. 1. 
4
The Japan Times, r1ay 17, 1972, p. 1. 
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The American reaction to the Brezhnev Collective 
Security Plan, as publicly detailed by Assistant 
secretary Marshall Green, was that a: 
non-aligned Southeast Asia is a worthy 
long-term goal; but there are a lot of 
hurdles to get over before you get there, 
and I feel that all of the leaders of 
Southeast Asia, while recognizing that it 
would be desirable to work tO~lard that 
long-term goal, understand these diffi ­
cult problems that must be surmounted, 
that neutrality, to be real, must be 5 
based upon adequate defense and security. 
A number of factors are, however, pushing the Soviet 
Union to greater initiative. With the recent vigor in 
Sino-American relations, 
Peking's reported flexibility on the 
question of the normalization of Sino­
Japanese relations, the current crisis 
in United States-Japanese economic re­
lations, and the current mood of Japanese 
opinion are all factors that may further 
strengthen Moscow's conviction that dip­
lomatic action in Asia in this stage 
should revolve around the Japanese 
issue. 6 
Responding in March of 1972, Prime Minister Sato, at a 
plenary session of the House of Councellors, expressed 
interest in studying the Brezhnev plan for the collective 
secur1·ty 0 fA·S1a. 7 
5 . .Marshall Green, Ass1stant Secretary for East AS1an 
and Pacific Affairs, II Interviewed on ~1eet the Press, n 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1712, 
April 17, 1972, p. 575. 
6Riollot, p. 3. 
7See The Japan Times, ~1arch 2, 1972, p. 1. 
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In part, the Soviet qood\'lill-offensive aimed at 
Japan is defensive in nature. The Russians fear a change 
in Japanese attitudes following the Nixon visit to 
China. More specifically, they fear the American ini ­
tiative towards China will stampede Japanese business­
men and politicians in calling for a'complete normali­
zation of Sino-Japanese relations. 
It was with both positive and negative aspects of 
the problem in mind that Foreign Minister Gromyko 
journeyed to Tokyo in January of 1972. The visit by 
the Soviet Foreign Minister had important implications, 
both within and outside Japan and the Soviet union. In 
China, for example, an improvement in Soviet-Japanese 
relations could only add fuel to the existing fears of 
Russian encirclement. Among the Gromyko discussions 
designed to stimulate better relations with Japan, it 
was "an open secret ~hat China had figured prominently in 
the Soviet-Japanese talks."S In addition, Grornyko was 
reported to have warned the Japanese: 
We wish you to have friendly relations in 
China • • • But I think it should be done 
without impairing relations with the 
Soviet Union. 9 
SnA New Move in the Great Power Game,n Newsweek, 




The Soviet use of pressure and interference in . 
Japanese political matters had long been a major sore 
point in the relations between the two countries. For 
example, the, 
Russians sent Deputy Prime Minister 
Mikoyan to Japan in 1961 on a good­
will mission. During his visit he 
remarked that Japan would be well ­
advised not to renew the security 
treaty with the United States. He 
was told in no uncertain terms that 
Japan would brook no interference in 
its internal affairs, and after his 
departure, Russia still ranked at 
the bottom of all nations in Japan's 
popularity poll.lO 
In a second example, the Soviet government in 
March of 1970 notified Japan that Soviet fleet units 
would be holding-firing practice off the northern 
coast of Japan. Although aimed at China principally 
and Japan only indirectly, the response from Japan was 
so critical that the Soviets agreed to cancal both 
operations. 11 The Japanese, in turn, have even insti ­
gated their own counterpressures. For example, in 
March of 1971 the Soviet media complained that three 
Japanese fighter plans had buzzed a Soviet destroyer on 
maneuvers off southern Japan. 12 
10Buss, p. 636. 

11 'b 108
. G1 ney, p. • 
l2see The New York Times, April 20, 1971, p. 5. 
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Although today, Japan fears the Soviet Union 
probably more than any oth,er. country in the world, the 
Japanese know that their suspicions are valid only if 
the Russians consider them an enemy. Today, both 
China and the Soviet Union compete against the other~ 
hoping to win Japan as an ally. 'Notunexpectedly, the 
methods each uses to induce (or coerce) Japan, differs. 
The Russians currently hold two major enticements (for 
the purpose of bargaining with Japan): the northern, 
islands issue: and the natural resources of Siberia. 
Given the choice, the Russians would choose to employ 
the latter as a bargaining issue. Among the, two al ­
ternatives, the Siberia offer has for the Soviet Union 
the greatest potential rewards and the fewest dangers. 
Moscow, in attempting to entice Japan with the 
Siberian venture, would like from that country one 
billion dollars in credit as part of a mutual invest­
ment deal. These funds would be used to help build a 
proposed 4000-mile pipeline, expected to carry oil from 
West Siberia near Tyumen, to the Pacific port of 
Nahodka. This, the Russians explain, would then provide 
Japan with an annual flow of 50 million tons of high­
grade oil. For the Russians, in addition to the othe~ 
concessions won from the Japanese, the agreement would 
help to fulfill the ninth Soviet five-year economic 
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plan, as well as to provide a ready supply of fuel to 
the eastern coast of Siberia, enhancing Soviet navc.l 
power in the Far East. 13 
The major problems yet to be overcome by Japan 
are associated with the footing of the proiect itself 
(mostly at government expense). In addition, the 
Japa~ese must erase the, 
doubt which persists over becoming too 
heavily dependent for such a vital source 
of energy as oil from a totalitarian 
government that could with a twist of the 
spigot turn off the supply • • • it is 
highly probable that the Russian deter­
mination and haste in the proceeding with 
this project are motivated at least in 
part by their controversy with Peking • 
.	Japan would surely be ill-advised to get 
caught in the middle of the Soviet­
Chinese squabble. 14 
Thus far, Japan and the Soviet Union have been 
limited to concrete agreements in outlying areas only. 
These agreements include the calling forth of Japanese 
assistance for the development of several Soviet Far 
Eastern ports, an agreement in 1967 providing for an 
Arctic route along the northern coast of the Soviet 
Union aiding transportation from Japan to Europe, and, 
an agreement that allows Japan Air Lines, as the only 




non-Socialist air line, to make regular flights over 
Siberia to ~,10scow. 15 
The Soview first offered the Siberian venture to 
Japan in 1960. Twelve years later, Japan had still not 
f.'I' ,I , 
made a formal move toward' acceptance. One reason for 
the Japanese reluctance in consideration of the project 
is the implications such an agreement would have for 
the American-Japanese security aqreement, and also, 
on Japan-China relations. In regard to the latter, 
the Japanese investment at Tyumen, so close to the 
Chinese border, would mean a significant political in­
vestment on the Russian side of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
The Nixon "shocks," however, have helped to push 
Japan and the ,Soviet Union slowly and cautiously closer 
towards reaching ~ome agreement on the Siberian ques­
tion. The Soviet ambassador to Japan, Oleg 'A. 
Troyanovsky, said in January of 1972, that the "Soviet 
union does not need foreign help in the development of 
Siberia" but any country is welcomed to share in the 
exploitation of Siberian natural resources. 1116 
Concerning the great potentials in Siberia, 
Pravda ran a series of articles in March of 1972, 
15Glaubitz, p. 36. 





detailing the need for new equipment and for the new 
pipeline. 17 The article noted that when completed, 
the new pipeline will carry millions of tons of Ob 
petroleum to the East. Perhaps as a warning to the 
cautious Japanese, the article noted that, since the Ob 
area and Alaska pose a good many common problems, 
"American firms are displaying great interest in what 
is being done along the Ob.,,18 Already, the daily 
extraction of oil has reached the level of "148,000 
tons."- The article concluded, pleading that the level 
"cannot go even one ton higher! Why? Because the 
existing pipelines are loaded to capacity.u19 What is 
needed, of course, is money (yen). 
Meetings between the two powers, which include 
discussions on the Siberian project, continue. For 
example, from July 15 to July 27, 1971, a National 
Council of Governors from Japan visited a variety of 
industrial plants and state farms, including a discussion 
in Moscow "of the status and further development of 
l7Current Diqest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIV, 
No. 10, April 5, 1972, pp. 1-6. (See also Pravda, 
March 4, 5 and 9, 1972.) 
l8Ibid ., p. 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 2. 
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cultural and economic ties and coastal trade between 
East Siberia and Far Eastern territories and provinces 
and Japanese prefectures. n20 
From February 21 to February 24, 1972, a confer­
ence of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese~Soviet Commis­
sions for Business Cooperation met in Tokyo. The Soviets 
proposed at the conference that Japan offer a bank-to­
bank loan of at least one billion dollars, at an interest 
rate of 6 percent a year, for the construction of the 
trans-Siberian pipeline. The Russian newspaper, 
Izvestia, optimistically observed that this fifth 
conference, 
opens a new page in the history of the 
development of economic relations between 
the two countries • there is complete 
confidence now that the present projects 
will be transformed into practical deeds, 
because the plans discussed at the Tokyo 
conference rest on sober-minded planning 
and on the objective necessary of peace­
ful coexistence betvleen the u. S. S. R. and 
Japan and of mutually advantageous cooper­
ation in the interests of the peop1esof 
both countries. 21 
Although, as yet, the fifth conference has pro­
duced no hard and fast agreements on the Siberian in­
vestment question, other joint projects were also 
20 Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 30, August 24, 1971, p. 
17. 	 (See also Pravda, July 27, 1971, p. 2). 
21Ibid., Vol. XXIV, No.9. March 29. 1972, pp. 15­
16. 	 (See also Izvestia, March 1, 1972, p. 2.) 
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considered. For example, ,discussed were the mining of 
coal in South Yakut l the d~velopment of oil and gas 
resources on the continental Shelf of Sakhalin, the supply 
of pulp wood through the port of Wrangel, and the ship­
(, ' " .
ment of natural gas from Yakut. 
The Siberian venture would,' of course, be pro­
fitable to Japan for a number of reasons. The expected 
hiqh quality of oil from Tyumen would reduce Japan's 
present major pollution problemi the sale of steel pipes 
and construction equipment would help Japanese busi­
nessesi other possible natural resources in Siberia 
might be opened to further development by the 
Japanesei and, with the opening of the Tyumen oil 
deposits, Japan would no longer be forced to depend on 
the Middle East. 
Indicative of an important segment of op~nion in 
Japan is Fumio Tanuka, president of the Oji Paper 
Company and negotiator with the Soviet Union for the 
pulp-e~ploitation in Siberia. Tanuka noted that lithe 
Japanese economy can no longer depend solely on the 
U.S. as heretofore," and predicted "the n.eed for 
Russian-Japanese collaboration based upon the develop­
ment of Siberia will increase steadily in the years 
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ahead. 1122 Trade between Japan and the Soviet Union has, 
in fact, shown steady growth. 
Following the summer of 1966 and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan, both sides have 
since held regular consultations at the ministoral 
level. This has made Japan only the third nation with 
23which Moscow has made such an agreement. 
In 1969. trade between the Soviet Union and Japan 
totaled some $730 million. In 1970, Japan replaced 
Britain as Russia's top trading partner. 
The same year saw Japanese trade vlith 
Moscow reach an unprecedented $812 million 
• • • This roughly equalled Japanese 
trade with China-- though Moscow left a 
surplus export balance while Peking im­
ported much more than it exported. 24 
This, however, also clearly points to a major problem 
in Soviet trade with Japan, i.e., the Soviet Union (as 
in the case of the United States), imports more from 
I 
Japan than it exportsR At the same time, if Japan and 
the Soviet union could reach an agreement on the Siberian 
investment question, the result of Japan importinq 
22The Japan Times Weekl~, February 19, 1972, p. 4. 
23 l' 7G aub~tz, p. 2 . 
24Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20, 1971, 
pp. 27-2a:- In contrast, U.S. trade with the Soviet 
Union for the same year was only $177 million. See 
The Japan Times, April 20, 1972, p. 17. 
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resources from Russia, would go far in correcting the 
imbalance of trade between the two countries. In 1970, 
the major area where Soviet exports to Japan indicated 
a strong increase was in round timber (i.e., from 
13,600,000 in 1969 to 15,300,000 in 1970).25 
In an Izvestia article in January of 1972, Japan 
was offered a "better deal" from the Socialist world 
than the current one they were gettinq from "Nixon's 
America." Russian and Japanese tradeilvolume increased 
even during the past year, despite the fact that 1971 
was one of the most difficult years for the Japanese 
economy in the entire postwar period." In December, 
a general agreement was signed on deliveries 
from the U.S.S.R. to Japan of industrial 
wood chips, and deciduous pulpwood logs, 
etc. The importance, outside the obvious, 
is that the Soviet Union is offerinq 
Japan a stable economic relationship that 
could replace in importance the one now 
shared between Japan and Nixon's 
America. 26 
In this sense, the Soviet Union is not only attempting 
to keep Japan and China apart, but the Russians are also 
attempting to use the Nixon "shocks n as well as other 
means, to lure Japan away from the United States. 
25 f h 10 0Current D~gest 2- t e Sov~et Press, Vo • XXIII, 
No. 28, August 10, 1971, p. 3. 
26I bOd~ ., Vo1 . XXIV, No. 2 ,February 9, 1972, p. 
16. (See also Izvestia, January 14, 1972, p. 2.) 
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The most important items the Soviet union imports 
from Japan are: pulp and paper, machinery and equip­
ment, 
including complete sets of enterprises 
for the chemical, pulp-and-paper, food, 
forge and press equipment, machine tools 
and instruments, as well as such indus­
trial materials as rolled ferrour metal 
and pipe, chemical products and other 
goods. 27 
In the past several years, there' has been a substantial 
growth in Soviet buying of Japanese consumer goods and 
raw materials. The most important Russian exports to 
Japan are curre~tly various types of fuel* raw minerals, 
and industrial materials that include coal, petroleum 
and petroleum salts, asbestos, nickel, aluminum, pig 
iron, commercial timber, cotton and other goods. ' Late­
ly, Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to Japan 
have risen. 28 
I 
A Pravda article in late 1971 expressed hope that 
Japan could develop the Far Eastern regions of the 
U.S.S.R. wherein enormous deposits of fuels, power and 
raw material wealth and industrial and agricultural 
27
Ibid., Vol. XXIII, No. 42, November 16, '1971, 
p. 	1. (See also Pravda, October 20, 1971, p. 5.) 
28 Ibid • 
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resources were concentrated. 29 Japan could make good 
use of these materials, si.:nce 99 percent of their 
petroleum and 100 percent of their lumber is imported. 
The movement in Japan business and public 
circles for the further,., development of 
trade and economic ties with the Soviet 
Union is explained by economic necessity 
and corresponds to Japan's national in­
terests • . • The first important steps 
have already been taken.30 
In 1968, the first general agreement had been con­
cluded and "went beyond the framework of ordinary 
conunercial transactions.,,31 
In 1970, a second general agreement was con­
cluded which declared the initiation of a cooperative 
effort between the t,vo countries in designing a new 
seaport at WrangeJ. Bay. The new seaport is expected 
to provide additional facilities in the handling of 
the growing volume of trade between the Soviet Union 
and Japan. In addition, the agreement also called for 
the construction of two new fishing ports in the Far 
East: .one in Troitsa Bay (Maritime Territory), and one 
in Kholmsk (Sakhalin Province). Moreover, a new five-
year trade agreement (1971-1975) was signed between the 








two countries, envisaging,a steady growth of exchange in 
goods. 
During 1971, over 20,000 Japanese tourists visited 
the Soviet Union, while air'travel over Siberia from 
Tokyo to Moscow developed a-c. a 'fairly rapid pace. 
Large scale tourism, an Izvestia 'article claimed, nis 
an important new factor making for rapprochement be­
tween the peoples of the two countries.,,32 Following 
the 1970 establishment ofttfraternal ties"between the 
cities of Kiev and Kyoto, the number in 1971 was in­
creased to nine. There was a sharp increase in the 
number of people studying Russian language in Japan. 
There has been, also, expanded cultural and scientific 
contact between the Soviet Union and Japan. The arti ­
cle concluded, hinting the "only thing required for the 
transformation of these possibilities into reality is 
to eliminate the obstacles in the way of full 
.. 33normalization 
Certain high-ranking elements within the Sato 
Government favored shifting the country's ties from the 
United States to the Soviet Union. For example, it was 
32 Ibid., Vol. XXIV, No.2, February 9, 1972, 
p. 	17. (See also Izvestia, January 14, 1972, p. 2.) 
~3Ibid., p. 18. 
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reported in September of 1971 in an interview with the 
newspaper Asahi, that Japapese Aqriculture and 
Forestry Minister Agaki had come out in favor of im­
provinq relations with the Soviet Union, rather than 
"dancing to the U.S.A.'s tune ••• ,,34 The means 
for the improvement in relations was to be found 
through the joint development of Siberia. By broach­
ing "Japanese-American relations in that same interview, 
the Minister expressed dissatisfaction with Washington's 
latest measures, which are seriously damaging Japan's 
.. t" 35 econom~c ~nteres s. 
The most important problem with the Soviet Union 
at Japanese insistence, is the northern territories issue. 
Since the Soviet Itcapture" of Southern Sakhalin and the 
entire Kurlie Island chain in 1945, every Government of 
Japan has insisted that the entire territory is not 
Russian. The refusal of Moscow to comply in some form 
with the Japanese complaints has been a source of irri ­
tation. between the t'tvO countries. The reversion of 
Okinawa by the United States on May IS, 1972, has only 
exposed and irritated the problem further. 
until 	t~e Nixon-China "shock,n the Russians had 
34Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 35, September 28, 19.71, 




even refused to discuss the problem with Japan. In 
April of 1970, with Soviet President Podgorny schenuled 
shortly to visit Japan, 
Kawashima Shohiro, Vice President of the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party, went to 
Moscow, intending to hold unofficial talks 
on the Northern Islands with Premier 
Aleksei Kosygin. The Soviets, however, 
rebuffed this Japanese initiative. Due to 
illness, President Podgorny's visit was 
cancelled, and Kosygin was unable to 
receive Kawashima. 36 
What the Japanese have lacked in success on the 
northern territories issue they have made up on deter­
mination. While the Sato Government had asked for the 
four southernmost islands only, the Japanese Communist 
Party and the Japanese Socialist Party had requested 
the return of the entire Kuriles chain. 
The JCP's maxi demand, of course, is 
prompted by its continuing feud with 
the Soviet leadership over the inter­
ference in the Japanese party's internal 
affairs, as well as the knowledge that 
the territorial issue is supported by a 
broad segment of the Japanese people. 37 
The Japanese have made the return of the islands a 
precondition for the signing of a peace treaty; while the 
Russians fear that a territorial concession with Japan 
might lead other countries, such as Rumania and China, 
36weinstein. p. 198. 





to clamor for similar consideration. 
The real problem centers not on the two nearest 
and smallest islands, Habomai and Shikotan, which the 
Soviets have made known for some time could be the 
subject of serious discussion. The problem is rather 
the two largest islands of Kunashin arid Etorofu, on which 
the Soviet position has been unyielding. The Japanese, 
on their side, have committed themselves 
to a firm official stand in their demand 
for their return. Maps in Japan nowadays 
do not show the national boundary as separ­
ating Hokkaido from Kunashiri but put the 
dotted line between Etorofu and the Kurlie 
Island immediately to the north of it • • • 
The recovery of these northern islands, 
then, must be regarded as a basic. if 
long-term aim of Japanese foreign policy: 
an option, in other words, that a Japanese 
Government is not likely to forego. 38 
Today almost no Japanese live in the northern 
territories since most were evacuated in 1945 to the 
mainland prior to Russian occupation. The chief victims, 
of the territorial problem has been the Japanese fisher­
men of eastern Hokkaido. It is they who. from 1946 
through 1970. have had 1336 fishing boats seized, 11,316 
crew members captured,39 22 boats sunk, and 32 lives 
38storry, pp. 331-332. 
39with the Soviet goodvlill-offensive highlighted 
by the visit of Foreign r·1inister Andrei Gromyko to Japan 
in January of 1972, 14 Japanese fishermen in a good-will 
gesture were released from Soviet custody. 
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'I . t t' 401ost f rom hOst1 e SOV1e ac 10ns. 
Another major problem associated with the return 
of the northern territories is that, should the islands 
become Japanese territory, such an action would, in a 
sense, "open the doorn·to the'Sea of Okhotsk, nowal­
most considered a "Russian lake.'" The loss by Russia to 
the Japanese would be strategic, and vlould allovl 
greater claim by Japan against the Russian-attempted 
conservation of the fishing resources in the once-rich 
Okhotsk shoal. Reports from the Russian press have in­
dicated the importance attached to this area and the 
resentment of even present Japanese activities. The 
"conunercial value of the Sakhalin-Hokkaido shoal was 
almost destroyed . • • because the Japanese conunercial 
fisheries persisted in taking undersized herring from 
41the already depleted shoal." Now, the Iflast remaining 
herring reserve, the Okhotsk shoal, is directly threat­
ened as a result of the stand the Japanese have taken.,,42 
For this reason, among others, the Russians have 
taken a strong stand on the northern islands issue. An 
40The New York Times, January 12, 1971, p. 2. 
41current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, 
No. 15, May 11, 1971, p-.-3g:­
42 Ibid • 
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article in Izvestia, in January of 1971. detailed the 
motivated s'trength of the Soviet stand,arguing the 
Japanese "revanchist motto of 'struggle for the islands. 'II 
are rooted: 
in the general trend of 'balancing economic' 
potential and military power,'. which has be­
come the 'idee-fixe' of Japan's mi1itary­
industria1 complex • . . in attempting to 
whip up a militarist and revanchist frenzy 
in their country, the leaders of the Liberal 
Democratic Party are clearly losing their 
sense of reality .•• it is an unquestion­
able fact that the actions of certain 
Japanese circles in attempting to revise 
the result of the Second World War are 
creating a serious obstacle (to peace.).43 
The above article was accompanied by another, five 
days later, in, Pravda. Japan, the article complained, 
was making "brazen territorial claims," and developments: 
have shown that the heightened militarization 
of Japan, directly threatens the people of 
Asia and the Japanese people themselves • 
It would be advisable for the soldiers of 
fortune in thet Far East to take a rook at 
the calendar and assure themselves that they 
are no longer living in the 1930 l s .•• 44 
In September, Pravda, in another among numerous 
articles, laid even greater stress on the territorial 
issue by dropping of the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. 
43Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No.4, February 23, 1971, 
p. 20 •. (Also, see Izvestia, January 26, 1971, p. 2.) 
44Ibid., Vol. XXIII, No. 5,March 2, 1971, pp. 28­
29. (See also Pravda, January 31, 1971, pp. 1 and 4.) 
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The article asked, why? 
Was it simply the length of time that had 
passed since the bombing? No, the cause 
lies not only in the time that has passed 
but also in the policies of certain cir ­
cles that are striving to make people 
forget Hiroshima . • • The Japanese revenge­
seekers try to 'justify' their claims to a 
part of Soviet territory mainly on two 
counts: that what they call Japan's 
'northern territories' had always belonged 
to her, and that their future had allegedly 
not been finally decided by international 
agreements, including those signed by 
Japan. 45 
To answer these claims, Pravda continued: "facts 
and documents" concerning the issue of the ownership of 
the Kurile Islands, 
incontrovertibly testify that long before 
the first Japanese made their appearance 
on the Kuriles, the islands had already 
been discovered, explored and settled by 
the Russians, and had become a part of the 
territory of Russia by right of discovery • 
• • The point is that the men in Tokyo have 
'forgotten' the unconditional surrender, the 
wartime and postwar agreements, which laid 
down how and what Japan would have to pay 
for her policy of militarism and aqqression, 
which had inflicted so manycalamitieson the 
peoples of Asia. 46 
While the Russian argument is correct, it is 
neither totally nor geographically germane to the issue. 
In 1875, the southern half of Sakhalin was ceeded to 
45S • Budkevich and M. Raginsky. "The Tokyo Trial: 
A Reminder," International Affairs (August 1971), pp. 
76-77. 
46 Ibid • 
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Russia in exchange for the Kuriles (in the Treaty of 
St. Petersburg). Following the conclusion of the 
Russo-Japan War in 1905 (and the Treaty of Portsmouth) , 
Japan kept the Kuriles Islands while taking back the 
southern part of Sakhalin. However, the Kurile Islands 
that Japan had won and held from 1875 to 1945 did not 
include the four southern islands that the Japanese and 
Russians dispute today. The two southernmost and 
smallest islands (Habomai and Shikotan), were, until 
1945, Japanese throuqh exploration and settlement from 
the early days. The Russians have for some time shown 
interest in returning these two islands. The Soviets, 
however, have refused to discuss the return of the two 
larger islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu. Both of these 
islands have also been Japanese since the early days, 
and were confirmed to Japan by the Treaty of Shimada 
in 1855. 
Although Japan's claim to each of the four is­
lands may seem equally valid, the Russians have con­
tended that, 
it is the Japanese side that has for many 
years frustrated the conclusion of a peace 
treaty with the U.S.S.R., seeking to sub­
stitute a discussion of the long settled 
'territorial issue' for talks about a peace 
treaty. The Japanese government has made 
·no secret of the fact that it does not want 
a real peace treaty, but a 'peace treaty on 
the basis of a return of the northern 
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territories.' This stand of the Japanese 
ruling circles clashes sharply with the 
urge of the peoples for a relaxation of . 
international tension and does nothing at 
all to promote the normalization of rela­
tions with the Soviet Union. 47 
The six-day visit by Foreiqn Minister Gromyko to 
Japan in January of 1972 was an indication of a modera­
ting position on the Russians side. As part of the good­
will-offensive, Gromyko's visit was designed to probe 
Japan's intentions following the problems raised by the 
U.S.-China rapprochement. At the same time that Gromyko 
was attempting to take advantage of recent Japan-
American conflicts, China ~vas using the northern terri ­
tories issue to its own advantage. According to a 
report in Asahi Shinbun (a leading Japanese newspaper), 
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai told a visiting- Japanese 
delegation that "the reversion of the northern territor­
ies has not yet been decided, but we support the return 
demands of the Japanese people. ,,48 
The major impact thus far from the Soviet qood­
will-offensive was felt in late January of 1972. Follow­
ing a series of talks by Sato and Gromyko, it was agreed 
that the two countries would study conditions prerequisite 
47 Ibid., pp. 70 and 107. 

48
. The New York Times, January 24, 1972, p. 9. 
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to the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty, 
"which informed sources said included the northern 
territorial problem. n49 Elimination of the northern 
territories as an issue would eliminate the major 
problem currently standing in the way to complete 
normalization of relations. 
The impetus upon the Soviet Union from the U.S.­
China "detente" and the shifts of attitudes in Japan, 
have brought about a sudden improvement in Russo-
Japanese relations unexceeded in the post-war period. 
The 1972 Gromyko visit to Japan also produced additional 
agreements; Foreign Minister Gromyko and Prime Minister 
Sato agreed to an exchange of visits by the Soviet and 
JapanesePrime Ministers; Gromyko and Foreign Minister 
Fukuda approved a cultural agreement and made plans to 
negotiate a scientific and technological pact; a 
further expansion of the already growing and important 
trade relations would be explored; the fourteen Japanese 
fishermen then being held by Soviet authorities would be 
released: and most important, of course, was the pledge 
to begin talks within the year designed to produce a 
signing of a formal peace treaty ending World War II. 50 
49The Japan Times Weekly, January 29, 1972, p. 1. 
50The Japan Times, January 28, 1972, p. 12. 
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The latter statement indicated an improvement in the 
possibilities of solving the northern islands issue, 
and indicated flexibility on the part of both sides to 
compromise. Moreover, the Soviets no longer demand a 
complete Japanese abrogation of defense ties with the 
United States as a pre-condition to peace talks. This 
new Russian attitude is indicative of the deterioration, 
in their opinion, of the significance of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty. In February of 1972, with the conclu­
sion of the Gromyko visit, Prime Minister Sato was forced 
in the Diet to defend his foreign policy; declaring he 
would not renounce the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 
return for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Sato 
was rebutting the argument advanced by the chairman 
of the Japan Socialist Party. The latter wanted the 
Government, to negotiate a return of all the Kuri1e 
Islands to Japan with the Soviet Union in return for the 
abrogation of the Japan-U.S. treaty.51 
However, the signing of the peace treaty with the 
Soviet Union will not end all the current problems ex­
isting between the two countries. The bad feelings 
that exist are due not only from Russian actions late in 
51The Japan Times, February 5, 1972, p.2. 
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the Second World War, but also are due from the bad 
feelings that have evolved in Russia from Japan's 
foreign policy in the last few years. More specifically, 
Soviet commentators have recently attacked the 
Japanese role in Vietnam for their production of war 
materials, in allowing the use of Japan's ports for 
the servicing and refueling of United States' warships, 
and in the diplomatic support given Washington by the 
Japanese Government of Sato. In addition, X-1oscow 
has chastised the past Japanese Government for the 
support given American flintrigues" against the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, as well as the signing by 
Japan of the treaty which normalized relations with the 
Republic of Korea. In fact, at one time, 
Soviet propagandists had gone so far as to 
postulate collaboration between Tokyo and 
Bonn toward reviving the World War II align­
ment. The visit by the Chancellor Kurt 
Kiesinger to Tokyo in l1ay of 1969 provided 
a field day for the Soviet press ••• 52 
One Soviet observer, writing in Pravda, saw the 
question of Soviet-Japan relations for the future is 
essentially a flpolitical struggle," flaring: 
52. . h"· . b· · Mar~an P. K~rsc, Sov~et Secur~ty 0 Ject~ves 
in Asia," International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No~ 
3 (Summer 1970), p. 459. 
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over the path that Japan will be traversing
in the years to come _ '~lill Japan continue 
to follow a course of military cooperation 
with the U.S.A., fraught with the constant 
threat of being pulled into the adventures 
of U_S_ imperialism, or vvill Japan free i t ­
self from the fetters of its military al ­
liance with the Pentagon and settle firmly 
on a course of peaceful development and co­
operation with all countries and peoples.53 
In other words, will Japan in the years to come continue 
to follow a course of association with the United States, 
or will Japan in the future come to depend more heavily 
on the Soviet Union, China, or even exclusively on 
Japan itself? This is a question that to a great ex­
tent will be eventually answered by the after-effects 
of the Nixon "shocks." 
CONCLUSION 
The period from 1969 to 1972 was critical for 
the development of Japan's foreign policy_ In that 
period, Japan evolved from a role as an indistinct 
shadow, mimicking the American image in foreign policy, 
to the role of a quasi-independent Asian Great Power. 
After 20 years as the junior American partner in ASia, 
Japan had been jolted by a series of Nixon "shocks.1I 
53The Current Digest- of the Soviet Press, Vol,. 
XXIII. N0:-47. December 21,1971, P. 25. (See also 
Pravda.. November 23,1g71 •. 1'-- t).) 
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Although U.S.-Japanese rt~lations had been dete­
iorating prior to 1972, the Nixon ushockstt 'Nent far 
in providing the stimulus necessary for improving 
Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations. At a 
time when the ties between .Am~r'i:can and Japan are "at 
their weakest point in the poit-0~r period, both 
China and the Soviet Union compete for the security 
that an alliance with Japan would provide. To a very 
great degree, the future course of Japan1s foreign 
policy \,/ill _~ave a tremendous impact on the balance 
of power in Asia. The Government of Prime Minister 
Tanaka is aware that 2.ny reduction of confidence with 
the United States in the security treaty must mean ill1 
increased dependence on some other Great Power, i.e., 
China or the Soviet Union; or on Japan itself. 
A question of primary importance to all of the 
nations in Asia concerns the degree to vvhich Japan 
might in the fu-cure I'earro.. Tb.e trsLlendous growth of 
Japan 1 s post-war economy allOYls for and necE?ssi tates 
increased poli tical, and even perhaps, L1i1i tar,7 respon­
sibilities. In general, it can be expected that Japan 
-;'Jill remilitariz8 ;~.t a proportional extent to which 
confidence has been lost in the reliability of the 
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American security alliance. 
Finally, to a large degree, while the Soviet 
Union and China compete to draw Japan, at this propi­
tious moment~ further away from its American ally, the 
United States finds itself also with a delicate task 
in Japan: to revivify and solidify those remaining 
ties of goodwill that exist between American and its 
"most important ally in Asia. tI 
173 

A S E LEe TED 
BIB L lOG RAP H Y 
BOOKS 
Barnett, 'Doak A. China After :Mao. New Jersey: Prince­
ton University Press, 1967. 
Buss, 	Claude Albert. Asia in the Modern World; ~ His­
tory of China, Japan, South and Southeast Asia. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964. 
Cole, 	Allan B.; Totten, George 0.; and Uyehara, Cecil 
H. Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 
Dutt. Vidya Prakash. C:lina' s Foreign Poli£r" 1958­
1962. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964. 
Greene, Fred. U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia. 
New York: McGra"v"l-Hill Book Company, 1968. 
Hellmann, Don2.1d C. Japanese Foreign Policy and 
Domestic Poli tics: rrlle Peace A;-reement wi th 
the Soviet Union. 
Hinton, 	Harold C. China's :rurbulent Quest. New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1970. 
Hsin-,hai, Chang. .America and China: A NeVI Aporoach 
174 

to Asia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. 
Kahn, 	 Herman. The Emerging Japanese Superstate: 
Challenge and ResEonse. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
Kajima, lVIorinosuke. Modern Japan's Foreign Policy. 
Rutland Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 
1969. 
Kawai, Kazuo. Japan's American Interlude. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
Morris, 1.1. Nationalism and the Right \'ling in Japan!. 
A Study of Post-war Trends. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960. 
Warth, Robert D. Soviet Russia in Worl..<! Politics. 





Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "(..Tapan's Global Engagement. II 
Foreign Affairs, (January, 1972), pp. 270-283. 
Buck, 	 J.H. "Japan's Defense Options for the 1970's." 
Asian Survey, (October, 1970), pp. 890-899. 
Budevich, S., and Raginsky, M. "The Tokyo Trial: A 
Reminder." International Affairs, (August, 
1971), pp. 72-78. 
Bull, Hedley. liThe New Balance of Power in Asia and 
the Pacific." Foreign Affairs, (July, 1971), 
pp. 669-682. 
"China's New Diplomacy: A Symposium I.n Problems of 
Communism, XX, (November-~ecember, 1971), pp. 
1-84. 
"China's New Diplomacy: A S:Ylnposium II. fl Problems of 
Co~~unism,. XXI, (January-February, 1972), pp. 1­
81. 
Curtis, G.L. "The 1969 General Election in Japan." 
Asian Survey, (October, 1970), pp. 859-871. 
Farns'Worth,L.V'I. "J-apan: The Year of the Shock." 
Asian Survey, (January, 1972), pp. 46-55. 
Gibney, Frank. liThe View fro!Il Js.pan." ForeifQ!, 
176 
Kahn, 	 Herman and Singer, f;Iax. "Japan and Pacific 
Asia. " Asian Survey ,(Aprj 1, 1971), pp. 399­
412. 
Kirsch, 	M.P. "Soviet Security Objectives in Asia." 
International Organizations, (Summer, 1970), 
177 
pp. 451-478. 
Kitamura, H. "Japan's Economic Growth and its Inter­
national Implications. II World Today, (May, 
1971), pp_ 195-202. 
Krasilnikov~ A. f1Japan and ih~' Developing Countries." 
International Affairs, (Fe,bruary, 1971), pp. 
41-45. 
La Feber, Walter. "China and Japan: Different Beds, 
Different Dreams." Current History, (September 
1970), pp. 142-147. 
Langdon, F.C. "Japanese Liberal Democratic Factional 
Discord on China Policy." Pacific Affairs, 
(Fall, 1968), pp. 403-415. 
Lee, Chae-Jin. 1I~he Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade 
Relations. 1963-1968." Pacific Affairs, (Summer, 
1969), pp. 129-144. 
Melby, John F. "Great Power Rivalry in East Asia. It 
International Journal, (Summer, 1971), pp. 457­
468. 
Mendel, D" H. "Japan's Security in the 1970's: A 
Symposium. 11 Asian Survey, (December, 1970), 
pp. 1031-1069. 
Onishi, 	A. "Japanese Interests in Southeast Asia: 
A Japanese View. fI Asian Survey, (April, 1971), 
pp. 413-421. 
178 
Pyong--choon ~ Hahm. IlKorea and the Emerging Asian 
Power J3a1ance. 1I Foreig,g Affairs, (January, 
1972), pp. 339-350. 
Ray, H. t1Soviet ])iplomacy in Asia. It Problems of 
Cormnunism, IXX, (~arch-Apri1, 1970), pp. 46­
49. 
Rhee, T.C. "Japan: Security and Militarism." World 
Today, (September, 1971), pp. 390-400. 
Saeki, Kiichi. "Toward Japanese Cooperation in 
Siberian Development." Problems of Communism" 
XXI, (May-June, 1972), pp. 1-11. 
Say~vell ~ \villam. "Japan's Role in the Pacific and 
China's Response. 11 International Journal, 
(Summer, 1971), pp. 506-522. 
Sergienko, I. "Japanese Militarism Raises Its Head." 
International Affairs, (June, 1969), pp. 29­
34., 
Simon, S.W. "Some Aspects of China's Asian Policy 
in the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath." 
Pacific Affairs, (Spring, 1971), pp. 18-38. 
Stockwin, 	 J .A.A. ":B'oreign Policy Perspectives of 
the Japanese Left: Confron-Gation or Consensus?" 
Pacific Affairs, (October, 1971), pp. 435-445. 
179 
Storry, H. "Options for Japan in the 1970's.'" 
World Today, (August, 1970), pp. 325-333. 
faira, Koji. "Japan's Economic Relations with Asia. 1t 
Current History, (April, 1971), pp. 225-230. 
Wakaizumi, Kei. "Japan and Southeast Asia in the 
1970's." Current History, (April, 1971), PP'. 
200-206. 
Weinstein, Martin E. "Japan and the Continental 
Giants." Current History, (April, 1971), pp. 
193-199 and 241-242. 
Yostokov, D. "The Foreign Policy of the People's 
Republic of China Since the Ninth Congress of 
the COrY.tI1lunist Party of China." International 
Affairs, (January, 1972), pp. 29-41. 
--- --- ---- -----
180 
PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS 
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. 
The Department of State Bulletin. 
Economist. 
Far Eastern'Economic Review. 
The Harold-International Tribune. 
Japan Report. 
The Japan Times. 
The Japan Times Weekly. 
N ews·v.,eek. 
The New York Times. 
-Peking Review. 
Radio Liberty Dispatch. 

Survey of the China r;~ainland Press. 

